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"Issuance" and the Dog and the Bone:





Man invented the wheel about five thousand years ago.' Al-
though the first vehicles were little more than sleds with two solid
wheels attached, they relieved man of the burden of having to drag
objects from place to place."
The desire to move surely was related to a desire to creates ob-
jects and to "have" or possess them." What man at first possessed by
barter, dragging one chattel to exchange for another,5 he later
bought with money. Buying, after all, is the "symbolic act which
amounts to creating the object"; and because money could buy what
man desired, very early in man's development it became synonymous
with power.
7
* Assistant Professor of Law, City University of the City of New York at Baruch Col-
lege, New York, N.Y.; J.D., New York Law School; member, New York and Connecticut
Bars.
I. Early examples were found in a region between Lake Van in Eastern Asia Minor
and Lake Urmia in Northern Iran. This indicates that wheeled vehicles emerged more than
five thousand years ago. D. WALLECHINSKY & 1. WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 916
(1975) (hereinafter cited as WALLACHINSKY).
2. Id. See also infra note 35 concerning the "drag" (move) connotation in the word
"draw."
3. See Jean-Paul Sartre's treatment of skiing, sliding, swimming and bike-riding J.
SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONOTOLOGY (H.E.
Barnes translation) 582-86 (1956) (hereinafter cited as SARTRE).
4. "in so far as possession is a continuous creation, I apprehend the possessed object
as founded by me in its being." Id. at 592.
5. "Where A delivers a chattel to B in exchange for another chattel the transaction is
a barter. ... GL. CLARK, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (1960 reprint) (hereinafter
cited as CLARK).
6. " ... [T]o buy an object is a symbolic act which amounts to creating the object.
That is why money is synonymous with power; not only because it is in fact capable of procur-
ing for us what we desire, but especially because it represents the effectiveness of my desire as
such." SARTRE, supra note 3, at 590.
7. Id.
The advantages of money, 8 including its anonymity and quintes-
sential degree of transferability and acceptability, as legal tender"
for all debts have, however, always been offset by concurrent "drag-
ging problems" - there is a high degree of risk in carrying money.
If stolen or lost, it is usually gone forever. In addition, logistical bur-
dens in "dragging" large amounts of currency from one place to an-
other are tremendous.1" To overcome these "dragging problems,""
negotiable 2 instruments, 3 as substitutes for money, came into exis-
tence very early in man's history. The first known 4 negotiable in-
8. "Money" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1983) and is specifically excluded from
the purview of Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code"). U.C.C. § 3-103(1)
(1983). See also infra notes 9 and 75.
On the Island of Yap in the Pacific, larger denominations of money stand twelve feet high
and weigh over a ton. Cut in the shape of millstones with a hole in the center, smaller pieces of
change are trundled around by means of wooden axles. The large money is displayed outside
the houses of original owners. Title is transferred by an inscription on the stone itself, and
possession is not essential to ownership. "One family traded for years on the hidden value of a
huge wheel that had sunk into the sea while being transported from a Palau stone quarry 400
miles away." W. IVERSON, 0 THE TIMES! 0 THE MANNERS! (1965) reprinted in WALLECHIN-
SKY, supra note I, at 1353.
9. "The most recent law dealing with legal tender is Section 102 of the Coinage Act
of 1965, 31 U.S.C. § 392 (reenacting a similar provision in effect since 1933), which provides:
'All coins and currencies of the United States (including Federal Reserve notes and circulating
notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking associations), regardless of when coined
or issued, shall be legal tender for all debts, public and private, public changes (sic.), taxes,
duties, and dues.'" DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FACTS ABOUT UNITED STATES MONEY
27 (U.S. Government Printing Office) (hereinafter FACTS ABOUT MONEY).
10. See supra note 2. For example, the present form of United States currency, first
issued in July, 1929, is over ninety-nine percent Federal Reserve notes issued in denominations
of $1, $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100. FACTS ABOUT MONEY, supra note 9, at 8, 22. Paper
currency in denominations of $500, $1,000, $5,000 and $10,000 were discontinued in 1969. Id.
Federal Reserve notes are obligations of the United States and are a first lien on
the assets of the issuing Federal Reserve bank. In addition they are secured by a
pledge of collateral equal to the face value of the notes. This collateral must
consist of the following assets, alone or in any combination: (1) gold certificates,
(2) Special Drawing Right certificates, (3) United States Government securities,
and (4) "eligible paper" as described by statutes. As required by the Act of May
31, 1878, the amount of United States notes outstanding is maintained at
$322,539,016 (sic).
Id. at 9. A finished note measures about 2.61 inches by 6.14 inches, and its thickness is .0043
inches. Id. at 22.
11. A million notes (see supra note 9) weigh about two thousand pounds or "slightly
more than four hundred ninety notes per pound. New notes stack two hundred thirty-three to
an inch, not compressed, and occupy approximately forty-two cubic feet of space, with moder-
ate pressure." Id. See also infra note 35.
12. See infra note 14 and text accompanying notes 80-135 regarding elements of
negotiability.
13. Id.
14. The first known negotiable instrument dates back to about the time of King Ham-
murabi's reign and is a bearer note reading, "5 shekels of silver, at the usual rate of interest,
loaned by the Temple of Shamash and by I. Company, to Idin and his wife, are payable with
interest on sight of the payors at the market-place to the bearer of this instrument." J. WIG-
MORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 69 (Library ed. 1936), citing the Ger-
man translation in M. SCHOOR, URKUNDEN DES ALTABABYLONISCHE ZIVIL-UND PROZESS-
RECHTS (No. 58) 88 (1913). Query whether the Code's new "promise" requirements would in
any way cloud the "negotiability" of this magnificent ancient writing? See infra note 98.
Draftsmen warn that obligations expressed in the form of "'Due Currier & Barker seventeen
strument dates back to within a relatively short time after the first
evidence of existence of the wheel, about B.C. 2,250-2,100 around
the time of King Hammurabi's reign."8
B. Assignments: Sales of Debts
Over one hundred years ago, one perceptive economist observed
that the discovery which most deeply affected the fortunes of the
human race was made by the man who first discovered that debts
are salable commodities."6 A sale by a creditor to a third party
17
may be achieved via "assignment," 18 in which the third party as-
signee receives the creditor's right to collect the debt. The assignee's
legal right to collect depends upon the universal principle that "the
assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor."'" What the assignee
normally buys is no less, but no more, than the assignor possessed.
That the assignee "stands in the shoes of the assignor"20 connotes
that the assignee is in no better or no worse position to collect than
his assignor. If the debtor has a defense against the assignor, he can
normally assert it in an action brought by the assignee against the
debtor. In other words, the obligation is subject to the same condi-
tions as if there had been no assignment.2"
The following is an axiomatic example: D contracts to buy
dollars and fourteen cents, value received' and 'I borrowed from P. Shemonia the sum of five
hundred dollars with four per cent interest; the borrowed money ought to be paid within four
months from the above date,'" fall short of negotiability. See Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. §
3-102 (1983). Although "I undertake" is clearly the equivalent of "I promise" [Official Com-
ment 5 to U.C.C. § 3-104 (1983)], "in doubtful cases the decision should be against negotiabil-
ity." Id. See also E. A. FARNSWORTH, REQUISITES OF NEGOTIABILITY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON COMMERCIAL PAPER 72-76 (2d ed. 1976) (hereinafter cited as FARNSWORTH).
15. Id.
16. E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 748 (1982) (hereinafter cited as FARNSWORTH),
citing I H. MACLEOD, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICAL PHILOSOPHY 481 (2d ed. 1872): "If we
were asked-Who made the discovery which has most deeply affected the fortunes of the
human race? We think, after full consideration, we might safely answer-The man who first
discovered that a Debt is a Saleable Commodity."
17. See U.C.C. § 1-201(29) (1983) for a definition of "party" as distinct from "third
party."
18. Assignments were not initially accepted as legal and did not gain popularity until
about the nineteenth century. This was, of course, an anomaly because so much had for centu-
ries been accomplished through use of negotiable instruments. See J. DAWSON, W. HARVEY &
S. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 907-50 (4th ed. 1982). American colo-
nies "received the English law of assignments as part of the common law." FARNSWORTH,
supra note 16, at 751. "Assignment" refers to a present transfer of a contract right to an
assignee; it is also sometimes used to refer to a writing evidencing the transfer. Id. at 753-54.
19. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 at 780-81, citing James Talcott, Inc. v. H. Corenzwit
& Co., 76 N.J. 305, 387 A.2d 350 (1978) ("The Code has continued the common law view
that an assignee of a chose in action, such as a receivable, stands in the shoes of the
assignor.").
20. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 at 780-81, see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 336(1) (1981).
21. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16 at 781, citing Wilson v. Pearce, 57 Wash. 2d 44, 335
P.2d 154 (1960).
$1,000 worth of sweaters from supplier S, promising to pay S in
sixty days for the goods. Assume S sells and assigns the right to
collect the $1,000 to A, his assignee, who pays S $750. Two months
later, if D fails to pay, A sues D. If D raises the defenses that S
never delivered the goods, that they were nonconforming to his con-
tract with S, or some other legal defense, 22 judgment would ordina-
rily be for D.23 A would be left with a claim against S for breach of
his warranty that he assigned a valid claim and that he did nothing
to interfere with A's right to collect the $1,000 from D.24 S does not
warrant that D will be solvent and able to pay - that is one of the
risks A assumes. But S does warrant that A will be able to get a
judgment against D in the amount of $1,000.25 What bears noting is
that in the case of an assignment, D's claims and defenses are pre-
served and may be asserted against A, even though A is a third party
bona fide purchaser for value without notice of D's defenses and had
no connection with the original underlying transaction. 6
C. Good Faith Purchasers of Commercial Paper
The process by which commercial paper1 7 comes into existence
and is transmitted through commerce involves an even more sophisti-
cated concept than the fertile notion that debts are salable commodi-
ties. It has been theorized that if man's individual well-being and the
well-being of society are "determined by the volume of exchanges
going on in the whole society," ' the ultimate concept of negotiabil-
22. These defenses include: failure or lack of consideration, failure to satisfy a statute
of frauds, voidability for misrepresentation or fraud in the inducement (see, e.g., Wilson v.
Pearce, supra note 21), lack of the obligor's capacity (such as infancy or incompetency), mis-
take, duress, unenforceability on grounds of public policy (see E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL,
STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 679-82 (3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter cited as MURPHY & SPEIDEL)
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (1981) and any defense arising as a result
of alleged breaches occurring during performance of the contract. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 16, at 781-86, which includes a treatment of "waiver of defense clauses" in consumer and
nonconsumer transactions. See also infra note 23.
23. As to "waiver of defense" clauses and their validity, see MURPHY AND SPEIDEL,
supra note 22 at 1268-73; FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 781-86. See also U.C.C. § 9-206
(1983) regarding validity of waiver of defense clauses in contracts and leases of nonconsumer
goods; Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979); and, criticizing
this decision, Driscoll, Bribery as a "Real" Defense Against a Holder in Due Course, 19 VAL.
U. L. REV. 397 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Driscoll); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 178, Illustration 12 and § 193 (1981). See also infra note 49.
24. The warranties of an assignor are set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 333 (1981). See also an excellent treatment of the subject of the assignor's
liability to his assignee, including problems between successive assignees, in MURPHY & SPEI-
DEL, supra note 22, at 1268-80.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333(2) (1981).
26. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 662 P.2d 385 (1983).
27. Concerning "commercial paper," see infra text accompanying notes 49-61.
28. MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 22, at 1269, citing SCHERMAN, THE PROMISES
MEN LIVE BY 393 (1938).
ity involves "the triumph of the good faith purchaser."' If an as-
signor transfers via assignment all that he has, negotiation of com-
mercial paper does more -- it allows a transferee a possibility of
attaining greater rights than his transferor had.
The process regulating circulation of commercial paper is based
upon a strict meritocracy cast system. If a special writing, known as
a "negotiable instrument," a0 comes into existence via a particular
process, known as "issue,"'" and passes into commerce via a particu-
lar process, known as "negotiation," 32 to a particular person, known
as a "holder," 3 the holder acquires valuable rights against the
maker" or drawers" of the instrument.38 Furthermore, if a holder
29. "The emergence in our legal system of the concept of negotiability has been of
inestimable value in facilitating commercial transactions. It is an important part of 'the tri-
umph of the good faith purchase,' aptly characterized as 'one of the most dramatic episodes in
our legal history.'" Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954)." MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 22, at 1269.
30. Supra note 12.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 136-53.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 206-09.
33. To be a "holder in due course," a person must at least be a "holder" as defined in
U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1983). Not only must he have physical possession of the instrument, but
it must also have been properly "issued" or "negotiated" to him. U.C.C. § 3-102(l)(a) (1983)
defines "issue" and U.C.C. § 3-202 (1983) defines "negotiation." See infra text accompanying
notes 136-53 and 206-09. Order paper [see U.C.C. § 3-110 (1983)] delivered to a transferee
cannot be further negotiated or enforced without indorsement. Indorsements of various types
are important throughout Article Three and are treated in U.C.C. § 3-202 (1983) through § 3-
206 (1983). Without such an indorsement, the transferee is a mere contract assignee, standing
in the shoes of his assignor. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26. The transferee has a
specifically enforceable right to an unqualified indorsement of his transferor under U.C.C. § 3-
201 (1983). Until he obtains it, he cannot be a "holder" and is chargeable with any interven-
ing "notice" of a defense or claim prior to receiving the indorsement. Accord Bank of Cyprus
v. Jones, Q.B., February 24, 1984 (12th para. of decision), quoting Whistler v. Foster, 14
Common Bench (N.S.) 248, 43 Eng. Rep. 441 (1863). Cf Bowling Green, infra note 172.
Upon receiving an indorsement, a transferee achieves "holder" status, obtains U.C.C. § 3-301
(1983) rights and also may be able to attain "holder in due course" status if he can meet all
the stringent requirements of U.C.C. § 3-302 (1983) (text set forth at infra note 37. See also
infra notes 47-49 and text accompanying notes 190 and 206-09.
34. One creating a "note" (see U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(d) (1983) definition) is denominated
a "maker," a party primarily liable on the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-413 (1983). "Maker" is
not defined in the Code.
35. One drawing a draft (see U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a) (1983) definition) or check (see
U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b) (1983) definition) is denominated a "drawer." A drawer is secondarily
liable on the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(d) (1983) and § 3-413(2) (1983). "Drawer" is
not defined in the Code. "Draw," however, is a plot fertile with seeds of many different fruits.
It has twenty-three definitions in one single-volume dictionary: W. MORRIS (ed.), THE AMERI-
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 397 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
MORRIS), and twenty-eight in THE WEBSTER'S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 553-54 (1977), where the synonyms include: "drag, haul,
pull, pluck, tug, delineate, derive. Draw expresses the idea of putting a body in motion from
behind oneself or toward one's self; to drag is to slowly draw something heavy or to draw that
which makes resistance; to haul is to drag with sustained effort. We draw a cart; we drag a
body along the ground; we haul a vessel to . . .shore. To pull signifies only an effort to draw
without the idea of motion; horses pull very long sometimes before they can draw a heavily
laden cart. ... (See also supra text accompanying notes 2 and 10). The definition of
"drawer" has five connotations, the third of which is "one who draws a bill of exchange, or an
order for the payment of money." Id. at 554. Note that a "check" is a draft if it is an order.
U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a), (b) (1983). See also infra note 97.
can establish that he has attained the highest status, known as a
"holder in due course, '"" his rightsaB are qualitatively different from
a mere contract assignee39 or even a "holder." ' A holder in due
course may collect on an instrument free from all claims41 and from
most garden variety defenses,42 known as "personal" defenses,
43 of
any party44 to the instrument with whom he has not dealt 5 except
certain exceptionally potent defenses, known as "real" defenses."
36. See supra note 15.
37. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1983) in part provides:
(1) a holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and(b) in good faith; and(c) without notice that it is over-
due or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the
part of any person.
U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1983). Taking for "value" is the subject of section 3-303 (1983); what
constitutes "notice" is the subject of section 3-304 (1983); and "good faith" carries its section
1-201 (1983) definition of "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. §
1-201(19) (1983). For a discussion of the "checkered career" of "good faith" in commercial
paper, see FARNSWORTH supra note 14, at 55-57.
38. "Rights" is defined in Article One as including "remedies." See U.C.C. § 1-
201(36), (34) (1983).
39. See text accompanying notes 17-26.
40. See supra note 33.
41. Section 3-305, entitled Rights of a Holder in Due Course provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free
from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and(2) all defenses of any
party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and(b)
such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as ren-
ders the obligation of the party a nullity; and(c) such misrepresentation
as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge
nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its es-
sential terms; and(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and(e) any
other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
See also supra notes 33, 37 and infra notes 43, 45 and 49.
42. See U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (1983) supra note 41.
43. Some of the "personal" defenses are set froth in section 3-306. The term "de-
fenses" as employed in section 3-306(b) does not include set-offs. Bank of Wyandotte v. Wood-
row, 394 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Mo. 1975). "Personal" defenses are all those which are not
"real" defenses. The "real" defenses are set forth in section 3-305(2)(a)-(e). See supra note 41
for text of section 3-305. The terms "real" and "personal" defenses are pre-Code in origin and
are not used in the Code. Still, the terms are commonly employed to differentiate between
those defenses which will be cut off ("personal" defenses) in an action by one who has proved
his holder in due course status, and those which are so potent as to be good ("real" defenses)
against even a holder in due course.
44. Supra note 17.
45. Section 3-305 frees a holder in due course from all defenses except "real" defenses,
but only as to any party to the instrument with whom he "has not dealt." U.C.C. § 3-305(2)
(1983). See, e.g., Hall v. Westmoreland, Hall & Bryan, 123 Ga. App. 809, 182 S.E.2d 539
(1971); Casanova Club v. Bisharat, 189 Conn. 591, 458 A.2d 1 (1983); Standard Finance Co.,
Ltd. v. Ellis, 3 Hawaii App. 614, 657 P.2d 1056 (1983); K-Ross Bldg. Supply Center, Inc. v.
Winnipesaukee Chalets, Inc., 121 N.H. 575, 432 A.2d 8 (1983); Canam Hambro Systems,
Inc. v. Horbach, 33 Wash. App. 452, 655 P.2d 1182 (1982). By negative implication, the
holder in due course does not take free of the "personal" defenses of any party with whom he
has dealt. However, for section 3-418 purposes, ("finality of payment") there is no such re-
quirement of non-dealing. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 524 (1972) (hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS).
46. See supra notes 43 and 45.
The underlying rationale of the holder in due course 47 doctrine
in the United States is presently embodied in Article Three of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 8 the law of commercial paper.49 Its phi-
losophy perpetuates ancient Hammurabian concepts,50 clarified and
refined in all their basic operational concepts by English case law
before the mid- 1700's.
51
As one of Lord Mansfield's seminal decisions" instructs, com-
mercial paper passes through commerce not like goods or salable
commodities such as debts, but like currency. 5 Although we adhere
to the general principle that no one can transfer a better title than he
himself has "Nemo dat quod non habet,'' 54 the law of commercial
paper allows conveyance of a good title by one with an imperfect or
voidable title or, in some cases, even by one with no title. Commer-
cial paper, like currency, passes through commerce with such speed
that it raises the doctrine of good faith purchase to its ne plus ultra
level - it allows one with void or no title to pass a perfectly good
title. Like a person who takes currency, a holder in due course of
commercial paper is the "emperor" 5 of good faith purchasers be-
cause he may receive good title from a chain of title containing a
thief in one of its links.56
A British judge57 recently concluded that the more a wise man
learns about the law of commercial paper, the more he realizes how
47. See supra notes 33 and 37, and infra note 49.
48. The Uniform Commercial Code ("Code"), U.C.C. §§ 1-102-11-108 (1983), com-
prises the Uniform Statutory Commercial Law in most jurisdictions.
49. There are three ways of attaining holder in due course rights: (1) the holder of an
instrument fulfills the requirements set forth in section 3-302 (supra note 37); (2) an eligible
transferee may be "sheltered" if he takes from a holder in due course [section 3-201 (1983)];
or (3) assignees of certain buyers or lessees of nonconsumer goods who have waived defenses in
case of an assignment (supra note 23) may attain the rights of a holder in due course under
the specific conditions set forth in section 9-206 provided such assignee took for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense. See U.C.C. § 9-206 (1983); Bankers Trust v.
Litton, supra note 23; Driscoll, supra note 23, at 409-11, 423, 438; J. I. Case Credit Corp. v.
Skjoldal, 296 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1980); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga.
App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973); Washington Bank & Trust Co. v. Landis Corp., 112 Ill.
App. 3d 182, 445 N.E.2d 430 (1983).
50. See supra note 12.
51. W. BRirrON, BILLS AND NOTES 9 (2d ed. 1961).
52. Miller v. Race, I Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
53. Id.
54. Whistler v. Foster, supra note 33, at 257-58, 43 Eng. Rep. at 444-45.
55. WITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 456.
56. Id. The holder in due course is accorded this protection not because of his "praise-
worthy character" (Bankers Trust, supra note 33, at 494, citing GILMORE, supra note 29) but
to facilitate all commercial transactions and encourage and insure the swift and unfettered
negotiability of instruments in commerce. The holder in due course doctrine keeps "oil in the
wheels of commerce." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 457. Without it "those wheels
would grind to a quick halt." Id.
57. Judge Leggatt, in Bank of Cyprus, supra note 33, opined, "The more knowledge
that a wise man acquires about the law relating to bills of exchange, the more keenly does he
recognize the deficiencies in his learning on that subject."
little he knows.58 The lack of knowledge about negotiable instru-
ments is rife not only among businessmen but also among lawyers
and the courts. It is not that business and professional people rarely
have contacts with commercial paper. The situation is quite the op-
posite. On a recent average business day in the United States, over
one hundred million checks valued at over $50 billion were written.5 9
Additionally, millions of dollars are issued daily in the form of in-
struments other than checks and millions more are passed by assign-
ments of contracts and leases of non-consumer goods which confer
upon their assignees"0 the rights of holders in due course.61 These
instruments and transactions explode into commerce daily in num-
bers representing astronomical dollar amounts. Still, they are taken
for granted in the same way that preoccupied automobile operators
drive without conscious concern for possible traffic hazards.
II. Scope of Article; Overview; References and Methodology
A. Scope
Like cars, negotiable instruments are widely used by nearly ev-
eryone in the world and are very much taken for granted. This arti-
cle attempts to show that the issuance of commercial paper is both
an intricate and technical process posing questions of enormous
import.
In examining the "issuance" 62 process, the article probes to find
how and why the absence of proper issuance impacts upon subse-
quent events in the instrument's life and upon the parties' risks,
rights and liabilities. It illustrates how proper "issue, '"63 the key to
existence of an instrument, its subsequent negotiation,6" and its sta-
tus and rights under Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code
(Code), is surprisingly omitted from explicit coverage in the Code.
To separate "issue" problems from other complications, the ar-
ticle focuses on only one instrument, i.e., a check payable to order
taken prior to issuance by the named payee and negotiated to a
holder in due course. A check taken by a third party prior to issu-
ance on which the payee's indorsement is forged is discussed first
only for purposes of contrast.
58. Id.
59. H. REILING, G. THOMPSON, G. BRADY & F. MACCHIAROLA, BUSINESS LAW TEXT
AND CASES 393 (1981).
60. See U.C.C. § 9-206 (1983) and supra note 49.
61. Supra note 60.
62. Supra note 31.
63. id.
64. See supra notes 14 and 32.
B. Overview
If commercial paper statutes are analogous to a driver educa-
tion course, "issue" cases involve only turning an ignition key. How
to turn the key is a problem involving split-second timing which
sparks Article Three's engine components into motion. But what
happens if the ignition key is stolen and the course is skillfully fol-
lowed by someone with no rights to the car?
Even more so than questions involving "conversion,"" "issue "68
questions at best only "hover on the periphery"' 7 of Article Three.
Its provisions, if mechanically applied, make for a thief's haven. It
may be easier and safer to steal via cash substitutes than it is to take
cash.
Taking a single instrument, e8 a check,"' as an example, this arti-
cle uses a kaleidoscope method - a series of changing phases and
hypotheticals - to demonstrate how selected events occurring before
"issue" affect an instrument's subsequent negotiation history and al-
ter parties' rights as to the instrument.
The article takes an unequivocal position on the long-debated
question of whether a thief can be a holder. It concludes with an
attempt to perceive Article Three title/possession conflicts in terms
of patterns and currents which carry negotiable instruments
throughout the commercial world.
C. References
The law of negotiable instruments in the United States, known
as the law of commercial paper, is embodied largely in Article Three
of the Code. Parts of Articles One and Four and section 9-206 also
concern commercial paper.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia and Virgin Islands
have adopted the Code, although Louisiana has adopted only Arti-
cles One, Three, Four, Five, Seven and Eight.70 The Code has been
applied in bankruptcy proceedings7' and "is generally considered to
be the federal law of commerce.
' '
72
65. See U.C.C. § 3-419 (1983).
66. Supra note 31.
67. See WHITE AND SUMMERS supra note 45, at 500.
68. Supra note 14.
69. A "check" is a draft on a bank and payable on demand. See U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(b)
(1983). "Draft" is defined in section 3-104(2)(a); "bank" is defined in section 1-201(4); and
instruments "payable on demand" include those payable at sight or on presentation and those
in which no time for payment is stated. U.C.C. § 3-108 (1983). See also section 3-104(l)(d)
and supra note 35.
70. U.C.C. 1978 Official Text with Comments, Table 1, XLIII, n.3.
71. In re United Thrift Stores, 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966).
72. In re Quantum, 397 F. Supp. 329. 336, n.2. (D.C. Virgin Islands D. St. Croix
1975), aff'd 534 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976), citing In re
III. "Instrument" Defined
A. Underlying Philosophy
Merchants who first took commercial paper as cash substitutes
needed laws assuring them that the instruments they were accepting
would be treated like currency. Instruments had to be freely negotia-
ble and readily salable and transferable through commerce without a
need for investigating the why's and wherefore's of any "underlying
transaction."
The checker at a supermarket does not inquire of a customer,
"Where did you get this $20 bill, and did you fully perform as you
promised in exchange for it?" Similarly, the law maintains that a
purchaser of an instrument should not have to look beyond the face
of an instrument to make sure it is negotiable 73 before taking it in-
stead of cash. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, one
purchasing an instrument in the normal course of his activities
should not have to concern himself with the why's and wherefore's of
the instrument.
Since negotiable instruments are "part of the currency" ' 4 and
"are subject to the same rules as money, ' 7 5 the preliminary question
in the law of commercial paper is whether the paper purchased qual-
ifies as a "negotiable instrument. '76 If it does not, there is no possi-
bility of acquiring the rights of a "holder" 77 under Article Three
and, afortiori, no possibility78 of acquiring the even greater rights of
a holder in due course.79
B. Elements of Negotiability
"Instrument," as employed in Article Three, means "negotiable
instrument."8" The negotiability of a writing is controlled by unusu-
ally stringent requirements set forth in Article Three.81 All of a
party's8" rights under the law of commercial paper may vanish if it is
found that the "instrument"88 which he sues on is not a negotiable
King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kucera
Builders, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
73. Supra note 12.
74. Whistler, supra note 33, at 257-58, 43 Eng. Rep. at 444-45.
75. Id. Article Three, however, does not apply to money. Commonwealth v. Saville, 353
Mass. 458, 233 N.E.2d 9 (1968); see also supra notes 8 and 9 regarding "money."
76. But see supra note 49 regarding section 9-206 of the Code.
77. See supra notes 33, 37.
78. But see supra note 49 regarding section 9-206 of the Code.
79. Id.
80. U.C.C. § 3-102(i)(e) (1983).
81. U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1983); see infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
82. Supra note 17.
83. Supra note 80.
instrument.8 At best, he may be relegated to the rights of a contract
assignee, 85 taking subject to claims and defenses of prior parties.86
Not only is there no presumption of negotiability, there is a pre-
sumption against it,87 and scholars agree with Code draftsmen that
"questionable paper" should be denied negotiable status. 88 The ra-
tionale may be that there is similarly no presumption that a writing
is currency or legal tender. 89 If a $10 bill is absolutely perfect, with
the single exception that Alexander Hamilton's 9 left eye looks as if
it may have a cinder in it because Mr. Hamilton is squinting
slightly, the note will not be "liberally construed" by anyone to con-
stitute a good $10 bill. 91 By analogy, unless all requirements of sec-
tion 3-104(1) are met, an instrument will not be treated as "negotia-
ble," and a party holding it will not acquire rights under Article
Three.92
Section 3-104 may be viewed as containing nine elements, all of
which must be present before an instrument is accorded the status of
a "negotiable instrument." If any one element is missing, the writ-
ing" is not "negotiable." These elements are that the instrument: (1)
must be in writing;94 (2) must be signed 5 by the maker9 or
drawer;97 (3) must contain a promise" or order" which is(4) uncon-
ditional;100 (5) must specify a sum certain '01 payable (6) in
84. But see supra note 49 and section 9-206 of the Code concerning attainment of
holder in due course rights by certain assignees of buyers or lessees of nonconsumer goods.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 17-26.
86. Id.
87. E.g., Jefferson v. Mitchell Select Furniture Co., 56 Ala. App. 259, 321 So. 2d 216
(1975). See also last paragraph of supra note 14.
88. WHITE & SUMMERS supra note 45, at 465. Moreover, the Code draftsmen specifi-
cally have so stated. See last paragraph of supra note 14.
89. See supra note 9 as to legal tender.
90. Only deceased persons' portraits may be used. 31 USC § 413 (1959).
91. The best way to detect a counterfeit is to compare it with a genuine bill and "look
for clarity in the portrait." FACTS ABOUT MONEY, supra note 9, at 13. The mold is hand-cut
with "gravers" in pieces of soft steel by specially trained engravers. "To become a skilled
picture engraver requires a ten year apprenticeship; to become a skilled letter engraver re-
quires a seven year apprenticeship." Id. at 10.
92. But see supra note 49.
93. "Writing" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(46). See also U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1983).
94. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1983).
95. "Signed" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(39). See also U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(a) (1983)
and, as to signatures, U.C.C. § 3-401-407 (1983). The signature on the instrument is made by
use of any name, word or mark used in lieu of a written signature. If unsigned, the writing is
not a negotiable instrument, U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(a) (1983), and the preparer incurs no liability
on it. "No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon." U.C.C. § 3-
401(1). See also QUINN. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST §§ 3-
109 - 3-111 (Supp. 1984) (hereinafter cited as QUINN).
96. U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(a) (1983) and supra note 34.
97. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(a) (1983) and supra note 35.
98. See U.C.C. §§ 3-102(1)(c), 3-104(l)(b), 3-105, 3-118(e) (1983) and supra note 14.
99. See U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b), 3-104(1)(b), 3-105 (1983) and supra note 35.
100. Supra notes 98 and 99.
101. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1983). "Sum certain" is separately covered in section 3-106.
money;102 (7) be payable on demand °s or at a definite time;104 (8)
must be payable to order 10 or to bearer;106 and (9) must contain no
other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer, except as authorized by Article Three.10 '
Before plunging into underlying statutory references and the
body of caselaw interpreting these various elements of negotiability,
it is well to keep two broad concepts in mind. First, an instrument
ordinarily is given in payment for some obligation. Unless otherwise
agreed, 08 where an instrument is taken for an underlying obliga-
tion '09 should the instrument be dishonored, an action may be main-
tained on either the instrument or the obligation, 110 further, the obli-
gation to pay is suspended1 until the instrument is due or, if it is a
demand instrument,1 2 until presentment of the instrument."1
Second, by specific Code provision," a4 the law of commercial pa-
per is supplemented by broad general principles of law and equity," 5
including legal principles relating to capacity to contract, agency,
fraud, misrepresentation, estoppel, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy and other "validating or invalidating" causes. 1 As the Offi-
See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, 301 N.C. 76, 269 S.E.2d 117 (1980) (guaranty
agreement providing aggregate amount of principal "shall not exceed the sum of $36,000" not
a sum certain). Cf. Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 535 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1976).
102. U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) (1983). See also U.C.C. § 3-107 (1983) and supra note 8
regarding "money." Foreign money is neither receivable nor redeemable by the United States
(FAcTS ABOUT MONEY supra note 9, at 26), but a promise or order to pay a sum stated in a
foreign currency is for a sum certain in money and thus is "negotiable." U.C.C. § 3-107(2)
(1983).
103. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(c) (1983); see also U.C.C. 39 3-108 and 3-122 (1983).
104. U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(c) (1983); see also U.C.C. §9 3-109, 3-114 and 3-122 (1983);
PP Inc. v. McGuire, 509 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1981).
105. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d) (1983); see also U.C.C. §3 3-102(1)(b), 3-110, 3-116 and 3-
805 (1983).
106. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d) (1983); ee alsoU.C.C. §3 3-111 and 3-805 (1983); Branch
Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, supra note 101 (guaranty agreement not payable to order or
bearer not a negotiable instrument); see also Shepard Mall State Bank v. Johnson, 603 P.2d
1115 (Okla. 1979).
107. U.C.C. 9 3-104(l)(b) (1983); see also U.C.C. §§ 3-102(l)(c), 3-102(l)(b), 3-112,
3-119 (1983).
108. U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (1983). See also In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa.
1962); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968).
109. U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (1983).
110. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(b) (1983).
111. Id.
112. Id. Section § 3-108 of the Code states that instruments payable on demand include
those payable at sight or presentation as well as instruments in which no time for payment is
stated. Master Homecraft Co. v. Zimmerman, 222 A.2d 440 (Pa. 1966). See also supra note
69 as to a "check."
113. U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) (1983).
114. See supra text accompanying note 79-61.
115. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1983). See, e.g., First National Bank of Denver v. Ulibarri, 38
Colo. App. 428, 557 P.2d 1221 (1976) (bank estopped from recovering for overdraft where it
had advised customer that a check payable to customer's order had cleared and customer
released diamond ring relying on the representation).
116. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1983).
cial Comments to section 1-103 elaborate, 17 the Code is structured
so that a canvas, woven of the entire body of common law and gen-
eral civil and criminal statutes, 18 decisions and public policy," 9
whether or not anything has been said about it before,120 overlays
and supplements all Code statutory provisions. The breadth of cover-
age of this huge canvas is so extensive that it encompasses "any fac-
tor which at any time or in any manner renders or helps to render
valid"'' or invalid "any right or transaction."' 22
The Code specifies that Article Three does not apply to
money, 23 documents of title,' 2" or investment securities12 5 and that
its provisions are subject to the mandates of Articles Four (Bank
Deposits and Collections) and Nine (Secured Transactions). 2 6
Moreover, unless the context dictates otherwise, 2 7 all Article Three
statutes encompass and include the entire panoply of terms which
are defined in the "general definitions" section of Article One.
2
Section 1-201 definitions are crucial both to philosophical and
mechanical aspects of "issuance," "negotiation" and rights of parties
in the stream of commerce who deal with instruments. Most impor-
tant, Article One defines the pivotal term "holder" which is used in
over half' 29 the sections of Article Three.
Section 3-105 aids in the determination of whether an instru-
117. U.C.C. § 1-103 Official Comments I and 3 (1983).
118. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 325-68; Driscoll, supra note 23, at 411-
18; Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267 (1966); J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 780-99 (2d ed. 1977); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 961-1017 (1978); Murphy & Speidel, supra
note 22, at 673-82, 712-20, 1156-63; infra note 119.
119. Id. These policies are of "such great variety" that they fill a "volume in Corbin's
treatise and more than a volume in Williston's." FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 332. "As
early as 1886, a large volume appeared on the subject. E. GREENHOOD, DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1886)." Id. See also, Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233-34
(1892) and contrast with Crichfield v. Bermudez Paving Co., 174 I11. 466, 51 N.E. 552 (1898);
Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362, 367, 122 N.W. 1, 3 (1909); Gellhorn, Contracts and
Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 193 (1972); see also supra notes 118 and 166
infra.
120. Anaconda Federal Credit Union No. 4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 P.2d
909, 911 (1971); Pope, supra note 119.
121. U.C.C. § 1.103 Official Comment 1 (1983).
122. Id. See also U.C.C. § 1-103 Official Comments 2 and 3 (1983).
123. See supra note 8; Commonwealth v. Saville, 353 Mass. 458, 233 N.E.2d 9 (1968).
124. U.C.C. § 3-103(1) (1983). Documents of title come within the purview of Article
Seven.
125. Id. Investment securities come within the purview of Article Eight.
126. U.C.C. § 3-103(2) (1983).
127. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1983).
128. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201 and "acceleration," in U.C.C. § 1-208.
129. "Holder," defined in Section 1-201(2) of the Code, is used, e.g., in U.C.C. §§ 3-
117, 3-118, 3-119, 3-201, 3-202, 3-204(3), 3-206, 3-207(2), 3-208, 3-301, 3-302, 3-303, 3-305,
3-306, 3-307(3), 3-406, 3-407, 3-408, 3-410(3), 3-411, 3-412, 3-413(2), 3-414(1), 3-415(3), 3-
416, 3-417, 3-418, 3-501, 3-502(1), 3-504, 3-506(1), 3-507, 3-508, 3-602, 3-603, 3-604, 3-605,
3-606, 3-801, 3-805.
ment is "negotiable""13 and whether the nine required elements3 1
set forth in Section 3-104 are satisfied by codifying when a promise
or order is "unconditional". 132 Seventeen sections, running from Sec-
tion 3-106 through Section 3-122, together with Section 3-805,s3
concern themselves in one aspect or another with the substantive and
technical requirements of negotiability in Section 3-104.
A prerequisite to any study of issuance, negotiation and the
rights of parties under Article Three is a preliminary determination
that the writing in question is an "instrument" ' 34 for Article Three




Once it is determined that an "instrument" 36 constitutes a "ne-
gotiable instrument,1 3 7 the concept of "issuance" comes into play.
"Issue" is defined in Article Three as the first delivery of an
instrument to a holder or remitter. 38 The essence of "issuance" is
"delivery," a term defined in Section 1-201.'11 With respect to in-
struments, it means "voluntary transfer of possession." 140 "Volun-
tary,"" in turn, is not defined in the Code but connotes a transfer
arising from free will.' 42 Unless the instrument, after being signed, 43
130. See supra text accompanying notes 94-107.
131. Id.
132. U.C.C. § 3-105(1) & (2) (1983).
133. U.C.C. § 3-805 (1983) is entitled "Instruments Not Payable to Order or to
Bearer."
134. "Instrument" means "negotiable instrument." U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(3) (1983).
135. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1983).
136. U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(e) (1983).
137. Id.
138. U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(a) (1983).
139. U.C.C. § 1-201(14) (1983).
140. Id. Lamb v. Opelika Prod. Credit Assoc., 367 So.2d 957 (Ala. 1979); Miller v.
Merchants Bank, 138 Vt. 235, 415 A.21d 196 (1980); McKirgan v. American Hospital Supply
Corp., 37 Md. App. 85, 375 A.2d 591 (1977) (judgment for defendant drawer of dishonored
check not produced in court).
141. MORRIS, supra note 35, at 1436, sets forth a definition of "voluntary" which
provides:
1. Arising from one's own free will; acting on one's own initiative .... 2. Act-
ing or serving in a specified capacity willingly and without constraint or guaran-
tee of reward. 3. Normally controlled by or subject to individual volition. 4. Ca-
pable of exercising will; volitional. 5. Proceeding from impulse; spontaneous. 6.
Law. a. Acting or performed without external persuasion or compulsion; b.
Without legal obligation, payment, or valuable consideration; a voluntary con-
veyance; c. Not accidental; intentional .... Middle English, from Latin
voluntarius, from voluntas, will, free will, from velle (present stem vol-), to
wish.
142. Wel-, see supra note 141, is defined as "to wish, will." 1. Germanic wel- in Old
English wel, well ("according to one's wish") ....
143. Supra note 95.
is "issued," meaning voluntarily 144 delivered 145 to a "holder" 14 1 or
"remitter, ' 147  there will be fundamental problems for the party
claiming rights under the instrument and for the maker or drawer of
the instrument.
As for the payee, assume, for example, that a maker or drawer
tells payee P, "I have made out this instrument to you; it is yours,
but I'll keep it for you." The instrument has not been "issued,
1 4 8
and the payee, without possession of the instrument, is unable to ac-
quire Article Three rights. While possession is thought by laymen to
be "nine-tenths of the law," possession may loosely be expressed to
be at least "99 and 9/10ths" of the law of commercial paper. Thus,
P apparently has the same monumental problems with this instru-
ment as he would have if a donor showed him a $100 bill and prom-
ised him, "This $100 bill is yours, but I'll keep it for you." Even if
the donor gave P a letter with a photocopy 49 of the particular $100
bill attached, P would be unsuccessful in his attempt to show that he
had a right to title and possession of the $100 bill if it passed into
commerce1 50 and turned up in a cash register of a department store.
In the same way, "issuance" of an instrument necessarily in-
volves transfer of physical possession151 of an instrument to a holder
or remitter. Neither Article Three nor any other Code provision of-
fers an answer to the question of constructive delivery.152 Finding an
144. See supra notes 141, 142.
145. Supra note 139 and infra notes 151, 152.
146. Supra note 33.
147. "Remitter" and "remit" are not defined in the UCC. To "remit" is to send. Morris,
supra note 35 at 1100. "Remitter" is one that remits (id) and connotes a person through
whom the instrument is sent. See, e.g., Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 363
N.E.2d 564, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977) (drawee bank liable for improper exchange of cus-
tomer's check for its own check entrusted to dishonest remitter).
148. Supra note 138.
149. The Government restricts copying of currency. It may be copied only in black and
white and must be less than 3/ or more than i- times the size of the genuine obligation.
Illustrations must appear in books, articles, journals, newspapers or albums, and "no individual
fascimiles" are permitted. FACTS ABOUT MONEY supra note 9, at 28.
150. See, e.g., Miller v. Race supra note 52.
151. ". . .[P]ossession and property should always be stable,
except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person. This rule can have
no ill consequence." D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888),
reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 428 (1973) (hereinafter cited as CHRISTIE). Hume
concluded that when the state begins its existence, each man starts out with whatever he "pos-
sessed" in the so-called state of nature, however fortuitous this "possession" might be. Justice
"is then only concerned with how men protect their initial stock of possessions." Id. at 10.
John Locke points out that "possessions" are so important that although a general can con-
demn a soldier to death for deserting his post, he cannot "dispose of one farthing of that
soldier's estate, or seize one jot" of the soldier's possessions. 5 J. LOCKE, WORKS Chapt. XI §
139 (1823), reprinted in CHRISTIE, supra at 381-82.
152. As to "constructive delivery," Hume writes:
Thus the giving the keys of a granary is understood to be the delivery of the corn
contain'd in it. The giving of stone and earth represents the delivery of a man-
nor. This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws, and in the laws of
nature, resembling the Roman Catholic superstitions in religion. As the Roman
appropriate answer requires exploration of general law controlling
property, agency, gifts, estates, domestic relations, contracts and
other areas of law.
153
B. The Dog and the Bone
After considering the "voluntariness" 154 of transfers of posses-
sion,' 155 one must still confront the law of torts, crimes, sales, con-
tracts, personal property, bailments, and nearly every other area of
law.
The concept of voluntary transfers of possession is one of the
richest mysteries 56 of all law and nature, since it relates to every
living creature's awareness of what belongs to him. It is probably
less related to "greed" or "pride of ownership" than one might as-
sume. An animal in the wild hunts for food and when it kills its prey,
it reduces its catch to possession. Because the animal uses its skill
and conquers the prey, the catch belongs to it.157 The hunter guards
its prey just as man guards his property.
The notion of an awareness of a right to possession seems most
basic when viewed as part of the living creature's connection to the
world around him. Possessions are often intertwined with "love"
which perhaps originates with self-preservation and is tied to perpet-
uation of species. When a puppy is born, the mother knows that it
"belongs" to her. If the puppy is lost, she frantically looks for it
because she has lost what is "hers." The puppy is her responsibility
until it matures enough to achieve its own independence.15 8 As the
Catholics represent the inconceivable mysteries of the Christian religion, and
render them more present to the mind, by a taper, or habit, or grimace, which is
suppos'd to resemble them; so lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions
for the same reason, and have endeavour'd by those means to satisfy themselves
concerning the transference of property by consent.
CHRISTIE, supra noted 151 at 429. It has been held that there is no issuance without a holder;
that negotiable instruments have no vitality until delivered; and that there is no "constructive
possession" of an instrument. Rex Smith Propoane, Inc. v. National Bank of Commerce, 372
F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
153. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp.
1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), remanded 607 F.2d 1994 (2d Cir. 1979).
154. See supra note 144.
155. Supra notes 151, 152.
156. "The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the fundamen-
tal emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science." Albert Einstein, 84 Fo-
RUM AND CENTURY 194, reprinted in EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS 22 (MCMLIV).
157. The same is true for man's hunting of wild animals. So long as they remain wild,
wild animals are not the subject of property, "either of the state or of the owner of the land
upon which the animal lives. They become property by being captured, dead or alive. Mere-
pursuit is not enough, though inflicting a mortal wound probably is." CLARK, supra note 5, at
163.
158. The mother knows she does not "own" her offspring in the same way she owns an
inanimate object. She will wean him and give him up when nature tells her he is ready to be
on his own. People often act in a similar manner. "The word 'person' thus involves two move-
ments, of separation and of union." P. TOURNIER, THE NAMING OF PERSONS 5 (1975). "Par-
puppy grows up, it begins to sense which objects are "his" to eat, use
or consume.
159
To bring this concept of possession half a step down to a more
quotidian plane, namely the level of objects, one can notice that even
as a very young creature, a puppy knows that when it is "given" a
bone, the bone belongs to it. Very early in its life, the puppy starts to
understand the difference between being given a bone and taking or
helping himself to that same bone from a plate on a table. 160 Giving
a bone to a puppy is a voluntary transfer of possession of an object
constituting delivery to the puppy and makes the bone the puppy's
property to have, eat or hold. The puppy knows that taking a bone
without permission risks punishment. There is all the difference in
the world because of a miniscule but vastly comprehensive gesture
occurring in a second's worth of time - the giving, holding out or
proffering of voluntary transfer of possession. The puppy does not
learn this distinction from man. Dog and man share this comprehen-
sion, having learned it as the law of nature.
There are, then, only two basic ways of obtaining possession of
property: lawfully receiving it or unlawfully "taking"' 6' it. The law-
ful end of the possession spectrum includes property earned, bought,
inherited, exchanged, obtained by adverse possession,' 2 accession 03
or finding.16" The unlawful end of the spectrum includes property
acquired by theft, larceny, conversion, deceit, coercion, extortion,
misrepresentation or bribery.' 65 It also includes various other crimes,
torts, schemes, devices or arrangements contrary to "public pol-
icy"16 and not treated as an approved means of acquisition because
of occlusions or flaws within the process of delivering transfer of
possession.
Between these two extremes of the spectrum lie immense
ents are charged by God with responsibility for the care and maintenance of children and their
power only extends to the extent necessary to discharge this obligation. Once the son reaches
the point where he can govern himself through his own reason, he is as free as his father."
CHRISTIE, supra note 151, at 362, paraphrasing J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERN-
MENT 3 (T. Peardon ed. 1952).
159. "It should be noted that the word 'consume' holds the double meaning of an appro-
priative destruction and an alimentary enjoyment. To consume is to annihilate and it is to eat;
it is to destroy by incorporating into oneself." SARTRE; supra note 3, at 593.
160. This comprehension is inherent in his behavior and comes from his ancestors who
"owned" what they hunted down. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
161. An exception arises when territories are taken by invading armies in war.
162. See CLARK, supra note 5, at 162-65.
163. Id. at 164.
164. Id. at 163.
165. Driscoll, The Illegality of Bribery: Its Roots Essence and Universality, 14 CAP. U.
L. REv. 1 (1984); Driscoll, supra note 23 on bribery as a "real defense"; and for a discussion
of a principal's right to recover a bribe paid to his agent, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 388 Comments a and b (1958).
166. See supra note 119. Even under Roman law, "you could not enforce a contract
which was against 'public policy.'" R. WORMSER, THE STORY OF THE LAW 135 (1962).
stretches of legal territories shadowed by grey clouds. "Issuance," in
the law of commercial paper is an almost limitless topic because it
relates to "first delivery" and involves the raison d'etre for the in-
strument and the substance or "underlying transaction." Was the in-
strument actually delivered? To whom? In what form was it pre-
pared prior to delivery? Was issuance induced by fraud or duress?
What kind of fraud or duress? Was the preparer of the instrument
incompetent? How incompetent? Was he an infant? Was the obliga-
tion legal? Was the payee "real" or "fictitious"? The possible fac-
tual and legal questions one might pose are as infinite in number as
the sum total of all the reasons why any person might want to prof-
fer payment of money to another and all the special and particular
ways in which that payment might be exacted. Code commentators
have noted that, as between a drawer or maker and one claiming
under an instrument as a party who dealt with the drawer, the un-
derlying transaction may awaken:
... all claims for rescission . . . whether based in incapacity,
fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, breach of trust or duty or any other
reason. It includes claims based on conditional delivery or delivery
for a special purpose. It includes claims of legal title, lien, construc-
tive trust or other equity against the instrument or its proceeds. 
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V. "Issue": Application and Selected Examples
It is helpful to consider as an example a writing which fulfills
the requirements of negotiability168 and to assume a drawer writes
out the following check:
March 20, 1985
Pay to the
order of Paul Pace $10,000.00
Ten Thousand and 00/100 * * * * * * * * * * * DOLLARS
STATEBANK
919 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 1022
(Signed) David Drew
167. See U.C.C. § 3-306 Official Comment 5 (1983).
168. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
Assume further that the instrument is prepared and signed' 69 by
Drew, the drawer, on March 20, 1985.170 Drew keeps the instrument
in his possession, waiting to meet Paul Pace and to exchange the
check for an original Matisse pencil sketch. At that moment, the
instrument is not yet "issued." The following examples are offered to
illustrate the issuance process.
Example A. Instrument Issued and Paid in Due Course
Assume all goes well. Payee Pace arrives, delivers the Matisse
sketch to Drew who "issues" the instrument, i.e., voluntarily trans-
fers it to Pace. Since the instrument is order paper,1 71 it requires an
indorsement of the payee. 217  Assume Pace indorses in blank, 7 '
thereby changing 174 the instrument to bearer paper. 175 Assume fur-
ther that Pace deposits the check in that form into his checking ac-
count with B Bank. B credits Pace with $10,000 and is paid by
Statebank which honors17 6 the instrument, debits Drew's account
with $10,000 and returns the check stamped "Paid" to Drew with
his monthly bank statement. Drew will keep the cancelled check as
evidence that he paid Pace for the picture and as proof that he is
discharged on the underlying obligation.
Most checks pass in this way smoothly through commerce. But
what happens if the process of "issuance" never occurs or is im-
proper or incomplete?
169. See supra note 95.
170. If it is not, we open the door to U.C.C. § 3-114 (1983) concerning the date, ante-
dating and postdating. QUINN, supra note 95 at §§ 3-11-13, citing Smith v. Gentilotti, 371
Mass. 839, 359 N.E.2d 953 (1977) and Allied Color Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 484 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
171. See U.C.C. § 3-110 (1983) and infra note 172.
172. See U.C.C. § 3-202(i) (1983). A depository bank may supply a missing indorse-
ment. U.C.C. § 4-205 (1983) Nida v. Michael, 34 Mich. App. 290, 191 N.W.2d 151 (1971).
Note, however, that where the bank had taken unindorsed notes as collateral, it was not a
holder and never attained holder in due course status. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Chess, 58
Cal. App. 3d 555, 129 Cal. Rep. 852 (1976). Cf. the notorious Bowling Green case, Bowling
Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970) where the court
reasoned, in conflict with most recognized authorities on the subject, that since a transferee
has all the rights of a transferor (U.C.C. § 3-201), if the transferor was technically a "holder,"
(see supra note 33), the transferor would get those rights.
173. See U.C.C. § 3-204 (1983) and supra note 172.
174. "An instrument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer
and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed." U.C.C. § 3-204(2) (1983).
In contrast, a special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose order the instru-
ment becomes payable. See U.C.C. § 3-204(1) (1983). This would perpetuate the order nature
of the paper and require an ensuing indorsement by the special indorsee.
175. Bearer paper is defined in U.C.C. § 3-111. It may be negotiated by delivery alone.
U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (1983).
176. "Honor" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(21).
Example B. Theft by Third Party177
Assume that prior to Pace's arrival, W, a windowcleaner work-
ing at Drew's home, sees the check on Drew's desk and takes it on
March 20, 1985 together with Drew's college ring and a $5 bill. W
has in his possession an instrument, goods and United States
currency.
1. Cash.-If W were caught before he disposed of the items he
would certainly be required to return the items to Drew. None of
these items were voluntarily transferred to W by Drew, their owner.
The owner has good title; W, the thief, has void title.
Since the law of commercial paper is primarily concerned with
the rights of third parties, namely bona fide purchasers for value
without notice ("B.F.P.'s"), what happens if these items are trans-
ferred to good faith purchasers? 178 If thief W uses the cash and it
flows into commerce, Drew will be unable to get the $5 bill back
from a bona fide purchaser for value 17 9 even though W had void title
to the cash.180 Currency passes through commerce in such a manner
that even though a thief is one of the links in a chain of title, a bona
fide purchaser for value obtains good title."1
2. Goods.-If W 82 sold the ring, even to a B.F.P.18 3 without
notice of the theft, the B.F.P. would have no title against Drew be-
cause W's title was void."'
It is true that the Code provides that one with voidable title to
goods' 8 5 may pass good title to a B.F.P.-better title than the voida-
ble title he himself had. But here W did not have a voidable title but
177. See supra note 17.
178. See definitions of "good faith" and "buyer in the ordinary course of business."
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) and (9) (1983).
179. Except for U.C.C. Article Three and Four purposes, "value" takes its U.C.C. § I-
201 definition. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1983).
180. Miller v. Race, supra note 52.
181. Id.
182. W here is not a "merchant", so the example is beyond the purview of U.C.C. § 1-
201(9). See infra note 185.
183. See Miller v. Race, supra note 52.
184. As for a buyer's liability in conversion, see WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45 at
499.
185. "A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value." U.C.C. § 2-403(l) (1983). Parker v. Patrick, 5 T. R. 175 (1793), cited as
authority for the New York Court of Appeals holding in Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow. 238
(1828), is the seminal case on this point. See also Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, 86 Nev. 714, 476 P.2d
3 (1970); FARNSWORTH, supra note 14 at 15-40 regarding conflicting claims of title to goods.
In a contract for sale of goods, there is a warranty by the seller that the title conveyed is good
and his transfer rightful. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1983). A seller's warranty of title is so ancient that
it is was codified by Hammurabi. This oldest code provides: "If any one buys a male or female
slave, and a third party claim it, the seller is liable for the claim." CODE HAMMURABI, B.C.
2250, (a Winckler trans. in Die Gesetze Hamurabis). See also infra note 225.
only the "void" title of a thief. He cannot pass a better title to the
goods than the title he possessed. This distinction between goods and
currency was clearly laid down in 1758 by Lord Mansfield in Miller
v. Race.'
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3. Checks Payable to Order. (a) Thief's Rights.-Since W
stole the check, he has only void title. But as to the unissued check
payable to Pace's order,18 7 is W a "holder"1 a8  or, at least, a
"bearer"? 189 "Holder" under the Code means one in possession of an
instrument "drawn, issued, indorsed to him or his order or to bearer
or in blank."190 W is not a holder because the instrument is not
drawn to him, nor is it issued or indorsed to him or to his order or in
blank. A "bearer" is one in possession of an instrument issued to
bearer or indorsed in blank.' W is not a bearer because the check
has not been issued or indorsed in blank.
One of the greatest advantages of using an instrument as a sub-
stitute for money lies in its safety. A maker or drawer in paying an
obligation can create an instrument which runs only to a specified
payee and no one else. This affords protection to both the preparer of
the instrument and the specified payee. If order paper 192 is stolen
prior to issuance, the maker or drawer can stop payment' of the
instrument. He will not lose the money and probably will not have to
pay again as long as the order paper is stolen by someone other than
the designated payee.194 If a check prepared as order paper is stolen
by a third party prior to issuance, the drawee bank may not pay it.
Payment to one other than the payee would breach the drawee's con-
tract under which it engaged to safeguard the customer's money by
honoring only instructions from the drawer and paying only in those
amounts and to those payees designated by him.'9 '
(b) Subsequent Parties' Rights.-Although all holders are bear-
186. Supra note 52. See also Tonelli v. Chase Manhatten Bank, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 363
N.E.2d 564, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977).
187. See supra note 105 concerning "order paper."
188. See supra notes 33, 37 & 41. Every negotiable instrument "is presumed to have
been issued for consideration," so that even in the hands of the original payee, the instrument
brings enormous advantages of pleading and proof. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 107,
citing U.C.C. §§ 3-408, 3-307(2) and Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's Proce-
dural Advantages Under Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1441 (1967).
189. "Bearer" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(5).
190. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1983).
191. Supra note 189.
192. Supra note 105.
193. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1983) concerning a customer's right to stop payment.
194. As to this problem, see infra "Example C" in text at page 25.
195. Regarding bank-customer relationships, see infra notes 212-16 and accompanying
text.
ers, 96 if windowcleaner W steals a check payable to Pace's order
prior to its issuance, W is neither a "bearer" nor a "holder." If W
indorses197 the name "Paul Pace" on the back 198 and gives it to X in
repayment of a past due loan, 99 is X a "holder" ' of the instrument
or, if not, at least a "bearer"? 21 In an action by X against Drew,
should the instrument be dishonored?
Since X is not in possession of an instrument "drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank," he is not a
"holder." He cannot attain the status of "holder" because the
payee's indorsement is forged.20 2 There is a break in the chain of
title occasioned by Ws theft and his unauthorized signing of Pace's
name. Since section 3-202(2) permits indorsement only "by or on
behalf of" a holder and W was not a holder, X cannot be a holder. 203
The instrument was never negotiated20 4 to X. A holder is one born
only of a full and proper "negotiation" process which has as its es-
sence "delivery.
205
A party can become a "holder" as a result of a first delivery
known as "issue ' 20 6 or any subsequent complete delivery constituting
"negotiation." Negotiation connotes any post-issue delivery to a
holder and requires voluntary transfer of possession20 7 together with
any indorsement 208 required by the form of the instrument when ne-
gotiated. Though "issue" means first delivery or first voluntary trans-
fer to a holder or remitter, negotiation means the next delivery of an
instrument in such form that the transferee attains "holder" status.
196. Delivery of possession of the instrument is a prerequisite to holder status. See
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20) and 3-202 (1983) and supra notes 33, 140.
197. "Indorse" and "indorsement" are not U.C.C. defined terms, although indorsements
are crucial throughout Article Three and are treated at length in Part two of Article Three.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-201(l) & (3); 3-202; 3-203; 3-204; 3-205; 3-206; 3-208; 4-205 (1983) and
supra note 172. One may read part of U.C.C. § 3-202(2) as containing the thread of a defini-
tion of "indorsement" insofar as it provides, "An indorsement must be written by or on behalf
of the holder. ... (emphasis added). This thread, when pulled, will unravel Article Three
provisions most satisfactorily to result in absence of "holder" and "holder in due course" status
by one taking an instrument with a forged payee's indorsement.
198. The indorsement here would be ineffective (see supra note 197), since it was not
made by or on behalf of the holder. Were it valid, it would change order paper to bearer
paper. U.C.C. § 3-204(2) (1983).
199. Newman would have given "value" under section 3-303(2) of the Code.
200. See supra note 188.
201. See supra note 189.
202. See supra note 197.
203. ". . . [N]o one in the chain of title which begins with the theft of an order instru-
ment can attain the status of holder and consequently claim to be a holder in due course."
WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 497 n.7.
204. U.C.C. § 3-202 (1983).
205. See supra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 197; Chemical Bank of Rochester v. Haskell, 51 N.Y.2d 85, 411
N.E.2d 1339, 432 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980).
Section 3-202 provides: Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument
in such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument
is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary
indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.20 9
Since X took this order instrument from W, who stole it prior to
issue without payee Pace's indorsement, X cannot be a "holder" and
hence cannot attain holder in due course status. X is not a "bearer"
because he is not in possession of an instrument "payable to bearer
or indorsed in blank."21 0 Again, the purported "indorsement" is inef-
fective because it was not made by a holder.2"'
If the instrument, with a forged payee's indorsement made by
W, were honored by Statebank, Drew would be entitled to have his
account recredited. The bank converted 12 money belonging to Drew
when it debited his account $10,000. An instrument is converted
when it is paid on a forged indorsement. 1 3 Under both the Code and
pre-Code law, the drawee bank is liable if it honors an instrument
having a forged payee's indorsement. 21 4 The drawee bank's liability
is based upon its contract with its customer. The bank is not a
bailee; rather, it is a debtor, and the customer is its creditor. 21 ' The
209. U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (1983).
210. U.C.C. § 3-111 defines payable to bearer; indorsed in blank "specifies no particular
indorsee and may consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed in
blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially in-
dorsed." U.C.C. § 3-204(2) (1983).
211. See supra note 197; Tonnelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 363
N.E.2d 564, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977).
212. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Chemical Bank, 57 N.Y.2d 439, 442
N.E.2d 1253, 456 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1982); WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 499-509.
Conversion liability, although not so labelled by name, appears as early as the Code of Ham-
murabi. Two of its sections provide:
112. If any one be on a journey and instrust silver, gold, precious stones, or any
movable property to another, and wish to recover it from him; if the latter do not
bring all of the property to the appointed place, but appropriate it to his own
use, then shall this man, who did not bring the property to hand it over be con-
victed, and he shall pay fivefold for all that had been intrusted to him.121. If
any one store corn for safe keeping in another person's house, and any harm
happen to the court in storage, or if the owner of the house open the granary and
take some of the corn, or if especially he deny that the corn was stored in his
house: then the owner of the corn shall claim his corn before God [on oath], and
the owner of the house shall pay its owner for all of the corn that he took.
CODE HAMMURABI, supra note 185.
213. Merrill Lynch, supra note 212. See, however, infra note 216 as to contrary princi-
ples in civil law countries.
214. U.C.C. §§ 3-419(1)(c) and 4-401 (1983); Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41
N.Y.2d 667, 363 N.E.2d 564, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1978); WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note
45. at 499-509, 551. But see infra note 216 as to foreign law.
215. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45 at 551, citing pre-Code and post-Code au-
thorities to the same effect. Private banking existed in the fourteenth Century in Venice but
did not begin in England until the Seventeenth Century when goldsmiths of London's Lom-
bard Street branched out into the business of holding customers' deposits and then lending
them to others-making them "true bankers" rather than moneylenders who lend "their own
capital." FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 42-43. Current English authors state, "The relation-
ship between a banker and a customer is that of debtor and creditor and is not fiduciary.
bank has no obligation to keep its customer's money segregated. But
the bank's agreement is to pay out only in accordance with its cus-
tomer's orders and only to the people and in the amounts the cus-
tomer directs. If drawees refused to undertake this basic responsibil-
ity, there would be no checking business. Except for when a
customer's negligence causes the loss,2"' every bank is under a con-
tractual duty to determine at its peril the genuineness of
indorsements.
In the above example, the customer never issued the instrument
because the check payable to Pace's order was stolen prior to issu-
ance. Drew, of course, is not discharged from any obligation he owes
to Pace. If Pace delivers the Matisse to Drew, he is entitled to pay-
ment of $10,000. Drew must pay twice if the stolen instrument is
honored on Ws forged indorsement by Statebank. Hence, Drew can
insist that Statebank recredit his account with $10,000.217
This situation must be contrasted with the result if the instru-
ment had been issued to Pace and then stolen from him. In that
case, we would enter a different world of "upstream and down-
stream2 18 plaintiffs," dreamt of and described by Professors White
and Summers.21 9 If Drew issued the instrument to Pace in exchange
for the sketch and the instrument was then stolen prior to indorse-
ment, Pace might turn to Drew for payment. Drew's liability to Pace
is discharged only to the extent of his payment to a holder.2 0 If the
Where a customer deposits money in a bank, this money is under the control of the banker and
is not held by the banker in the form of a trust. ... K. SMITH AND D. KEENAN, ENGLISH
LAW 452 (7th ed. 1983) (hereinafter cited as SMITH AND KEENAN).
216. Cf. Merrill Lynch, supra note 212; see also WHITE AND SUMMERS supra note 45, at
552-600; Wormhoudt Lumber Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 231 Iowa 928, 2 N.W.2d 267
(1942). Under English law, the same principle is true for forged payee's indorsements. "A
forgery will not pass a good title to the bill. A forged signature is in effect no signature at all
and cannot pass any title." SMITH AND KEENAN supra note 215, at 443. In France, if a check
bearing a forged drawer's signature is paid by the drawee, the loss falls on the drawer." Farns-
worth, The Check in France and the United States, 36 TUL. L. REV. 245 (1962). Moreover, in
most other civil law countries, under the Uniform Codes on Bills of Exchange and Checks
drafted in Geneva over fifty years ago, a holder may get a good title even where order paper is
stolen and the payee's signature is forged if he takes through a chain of uninterrupted indorse-
ments in good faith and without gross negligence; the drawee is bound to examine only exter-
nal regularities. Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938).
217. U.C.C. § 4-401; Tonelli, supra note 147; WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra notes 45 and
212. Cf. supra note 216 concerning civil law.
218. As to "streams," the word "currency" from Medieval Latin currentia, a flowing, is
the same in both money and movement of currents of rivers. MORRIS, supra note 35, at 324
under "currency." It coursed down to us from Old French corant, the present participle of
courre, to run, from Latin currere. Id. Its heart, in turn, is motion coming from kers, to run,
which in suffixed form is the Latin carrus, a two-wheeled wagon from which we also get a
bounty of words, notably "chariot," "carry," and "car." Id. at 1522. As to river banks or
banks of streams and banks which hold money, they too come from the same root "bheg." Id.
at 104-05. This in Old High German was banc which meant bench or money-changer's table.
Id. at 1508.
219. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 492-518.
220. U.C.C. § 3-603 and Official Comment 5 (1983).
check is honored by Statebank and Drew's account is debited, Pace
may claim that Drew's underlying obligation was never discharged
and might sue Drew for $10,000. But would Pace be successful?221
One can peruse a wealth of legal resources for a solution to this
problem. 22 But post-issuance problems lie beyond the scope of this
discussion. This article focuses only on pre-issue and non-issue
problems.
Example C. Theft by Named Payee
When Pace arrives, Drew examines the Matisse sketch, has sec-
ond thoughts and asks for "a few days" to think about the purchase.
Pace agrees but before he leaves with the sketch, Pace steals the
check made out to him from a desk drawer. 22 3
1. Thief's Rights.-If payee Pace stole this instrument paya-
ble to his order, Drew could recover it from him since Pace has no
title. Anyone not holding in due course takes subject to the defense
that he acquired the instrument by theft.22 As Code commentators
have noted, this firm principle-founded upon a universal abhorence
of thefts and thieves-"is based on the policy which refuses to aid a
proved thief to recover, and refuses to aid him indirectly by permit-
ting his transferee to recover unless the transferee is a holder in due
course."'2 5 Whether Pace, having stolen order paper naming him as
payee, is a "holder '2 6 is a much more challenging question. 27
221. See U.C.C. § 3-802 (1983). Suppose Pace puts the unindorsed check in his nightt-
able drawer, leaves for Europe and finds it missing when he returns. Meanwhile, drawee has
paid it. Does payee have a good cause of action against drawer? True, drawer can recover
from drawee, but must he pay payee first? Once drawee has paid, payee no longer has a valid
claim against drawer but must go against drawee. See WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45 at
497 n.7.
222. See, e.g., WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, Chapter 15.
223. "Desk drawer" here, again meaning "to pull," comes from the same word as
"drawer," one who "draws" or pulls an instrument. See supra note 35.
224. U.C.C. § 3-306(d) (1983).
225. U.C.C. § 3-306, Official Comment 5 (1983). As to lost or stolen goods thereafter
purchased bona fide under English, French, Dutch, Swiss and German law, see "Explanatory
Report on Draft Uniform Law on the Protection of Bona Fide Purchaser of Corporeal Mov-
ables" (UNIDROIT 1968), FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 31-33. See also supra notes 151
and 184-85. For the past twenty years, the United States has participated fully in international
efforts to unify and harmonize private law. The Code, more than the law of any other country,
has been viewed as the most modern commercial code in the world. Pfund, United States
Participation in International Unification of Private Law, 19 INT'L LAW. 505, 517 (1985).
226. Supra notes 33, 188. As to conversion, see supra note 212.
227. E.g., "If an instrument is payable to bearer, either because it was issued that way
and continued its life as a bearer instrument ('pay to the order of Cash') or because it was
indorsed in blank by a holder ('Joe Jones'), the possessor of the instrument will be a holder
.... WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 459. "The thief in possession of bearer paper
probably satisfies the requirements of 1-201(20); in any event his indorsement in unnecessary
to confer holder status on his transferee." Id. at 415 n.54. "Even without delivery, a finder or a
thief of a bearer instrument is always a holder." C. WEBER, COMMERCIAL PAPER IN A NUT-
SHELL 103 (3d ed. 1982). "If the check, is bearer paper ... [allthough thief is not a holder
The words "theft" and "stealing" have been held to be synony-
mous. 18 Both are popular terms for larceny, except that "theft" is
broader229 and may encompass deprivations of another's property not
covered by a particular statute. The term "steal" is generic; apart
from any statutory definitions, it means the taking of property of
another or the taking or appropriating of property without right or
leave and with intent to make use of it wrongfully.2"' One who
causes another to steal for him is guilty of larceny. 31 Note that at
the moment Pace takes the instrument, he commits only a theft of a
writing owned by Drew, not a theft of funds via a forged
indorsement.
2 32
One merely in possession of stolen property may violate criminal
statutes, since an inference 3 3 arises from the fact of possession
which is sufficient to constitute prima facie proof that the possessor
is the thief.
2 34
Even acquiring lost property without taking reasonable mea-
sures to return it to the owner may constitute criminal conduct.288
Though successful criminal prosecutions against acquirers of lost
property are rare, the possessor of a lost check236 cannot maintain a
civil action to collect on the check.237 If the instrument prepared by
Drew were left at Pace's office instead of in Drew's desk drawer,
payee Pace would be unable to attain "holder" status, and in a civil
(the check was not delivered to him by the Payee), the next person to whom thief delivers...
may be a holder in due course." Id. at 366. "Delivery is necessary to transfer title to the
instrument, to constitute any person a holder and to impose liability upon signers of the instru-
ment." Id. at 84.
228. Ludwig v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 123 Misc. 189, 204 N.Y.S. 465 (1924).
229. Id.
230. People v. Neiss, 92 Misc. 2d 839, 401 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1978).
231. People v. Negrin, 24 Misc.2d 181, 201 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1960).
232. The essence of larceny is a taking against the will of the owner. The Queen v.
Prince, Court for Crown Cases Reserved, I L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 150 (1868) (where wife forged
her husband's signature to get all his money from his bank and left him for defendant Prince
to whom she gave some of the money, Prince's conviction for larceny was not sustained, al-
though he might be liable to the owner in trespass). In 1833 in England, a wife was improperly
convicted for stealing money from her husband's locked box to pay her former husband's
debts, because a married woman could not then be convicted of taking her husband's property.
Rex v. Willis, I Moody 375, 168 Eng. Rep. 1309 (1833). Today, one spouse can be guilty of
larceny of the other's property. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 815, 215 S.W.2d 1004
(1948); Regina v. Kenny, 13 Cox C.C. 397 (1877); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d
822 (1947); People v. Swaim, 80 Cal. 46, 22 P. 67 (1889); State v. Herndon, 158 Fla. 115, 27
So.2d 833 (1946).
233. People v. Shurn, 69 A.D.2d 64, 418 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1979), but the inference is fluid
and requires consideration of all circumstances. People v. Sim, 53 A.D.2d 992, 386 N.Y.S.2d
114 (1976), affd 44 N.Y.2d 758, 376 N.E.2d 1331, 405 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1978).
234. Shurn, supra note 233.
235. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05(2)(b) (McKinney 1975).
236. See U.C.C. § 3-804 (1983) concerning an owner's actions on lost, destroyed or sto-
len instruments.
237. Infra note 257.
action, Pace is barred on public policy grounds"' from enforcing
payment in his own name.
23 9
If payee Pace is a thief, can he be a "holder" of the stolen in-
strument? It is axiomatic under Article Three that both "issue"
240
and "negotiation ' 24 1 require "delivery" 242 by voluntary 243 transfer of
possession. 24 Unless the preparer delivers, there is no first delivery




On a dark night a firefly may, for an instant, look just like a
star. In this illusion, several perception errors occur simultaneously.
If where and how a person sees an object "depends on the input from
almost every joint in the body, '24 6 then what that person makes of
those perceptions depends on much more and seems peculiarly a
province of the law. The law of commercial paper is no exception.
Section 1-201's "holder" definition-a person in possession of
an instrument drawn, issued or indorsed to him or his order or to
bearer or in blank 24 -may, like a firefly, create a "holder" illusion.
But when the definition is linked to Article Three's "issue" and "ne-
gotiation" definitions, 2 8 as it must be, it again becomes clear that
the essence of "holder" is volition. Section 3-202 states that, "Nego-
tiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the trans-
feree becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is
negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to
bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
2
The Official Comments to a later section add, "Negotiation
under this Article always includes delivery. (Section 3-202, and see
Section 1-201(14)). Acquisition of possession by a thief can there-
fore never be negotiation under this section. But delivery by the thief
to another person may be."2 0
238. Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 16, at 330-63; Driscoll, supra note 23, at 412-28.
239. Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 16, at 330-63; Driscoll, supra note 23, at 412-28; Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 674 (1935); McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465,
166 N.E.2d 494, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1960) (defense to suit for accounting based on legal
commissions agreement that contract was performed in a manner offensive to public policy
against commercial bribery); infra notes 257-58.
240. Supra notes 138-67.
241. U.C.C. § 3-202 (1983).
242. Supra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
243. Supra notes 141-42.
244. Supra note 151.
245. Infra note 305.
246. Nobel Prize winner Roger Sperry, professor of psychobiology, quoted in 16 SMITH-
SONIAN 101 (April 1985).
247. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1985); see also supra notes 33 and 129.
248. Supra notes 138-67; U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (1983).
249. U.C.C. § 3-202(l) (1983).
250. U.C.C. § 3-207, Official Comment 3 (1983).
Before giving "value, '""' payee Pace can at most become a
"holder," and this possibility is dependent upon Drew's leave. Since
this is his highest post-issue status, what impetus does Article Three
give any payee to await delivery? None, because by stealing a thief
attains the same rights. To permit any thief to steal and thereby
become a "holder" of what he takes engenders violence and larceny.
Moreover, theft of the instrument itself, being criminal in nature, is




A thief lacks "holder" status whether he steals before or after
issuance and regardless of whether the writing is order or bearer pa-
per. "Holding," even not in due course, brings with it enormous ad-
vantages of pleading and proof.153 The Code specifically accords a
"holder" the right to negotiate an instrument further into com-
merce, 4 to discharge5  it and to enforce it in his own name. 56
As for a thief's right to enforce payment in his own name, no
court will lend its aid to one seeking to take advantage of his own
wrong or to acquire property by his own crime.257 Under doctrines
much older than even the first laws of England, a known thief can
not enforce the instrument in an American court. 258 Naked posses-
sion of issued currency, bearer paper or unissued order paper show-
ing a thief as payee gives the thief power to transfer the paper, but
he has no Article Three right as a holder to do so. After a transfer
to a good faith purchaser, a thief may be deemed to have possessed
251. Supra note 37.
252. Although under section 3-404 a forgery may be "ratified," what is meant is that it
may be "adopted" and, if that is done, "ratified" merely indicates retroactivity; criminal liabil-
ity is not relieved. U.C.C. § 3-404 Official Comment 2 (1983). In New York a private owner
cannot forgive the crime of larceny. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.45 (McKinney 1975). He may
agree to take restitution but not on any express or implied promise to refrain from initiating a
criminal prosecution. Id. For a discussion of the nonratifiable nature of criminal acts generally,
see Driscoll, supra note 23, at 424-27.
253. Supra notes 187-88. A "holder" can collect on the instrument. Once signatures are
admitted or established, he need only produce the instrument, and he can recover on it unless
the defendant establishes a defense. U.C.C. § 3-307(3) (1983).
254. U.C.C. § 3-301 (1983).
255. Id. U.C.C. §§ 3-603, 3-601, 3-605 (1983). It becomes crucial to know who "hold-
ers" are. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 444. One taking overdue paper would not be
a holder in due course but would be a "holder." See discussion, Id. at 443-54.
256. U.C.C. § 3-301 (1983).
257. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188, 5 L.R.A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819
(1889) sets forth:
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his
own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property
by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foun-
dation in universal law administered in all civilized countries and have nowhere
been superseded by statutes.
Id. at 115 N.Y. 511-12.
258. The maxims have been found in the Ulpian Digest, appearing as nemo ex delicto
meliorem suam conditionem facere potest. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise:
Legal Principles and the Form of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 645 (1981).
a power to transfer. This determination exists only to assure there
are no legal "stop" signs in commerce to impede the motion of pa-
per. Since Miller v. Race,25 9 the raison d'etre of that policy is the
protection not of thieves, but of those holding in due course.
26 0
An unissued instrument whether bearer or order paper in the
hands of a thief is most succinctly treated as nondrawn, nonpos-
sessed and hence only a shadow of an "instrument."'261 That places
the thief outside the purview of the section 1-201 "holder" definition.
The Code's approach in no way impairs the free motion of paper in
commerce and leaves Article Three both in synchrony with ancient
concepts of law and respectable as a practical commercial code.
2. Drawers' and Subsequent Parties' Rights.-If a check is
stolen prior to issuance, what are drawer Drew's rights? It has been
held 262 that a drawer has no "valuable" rights" in an instrument be-
cause he has no right to present it to a drawee for payment-he has
no rights other than the right to the physical paper on which the
check is written. Accordingly, the drawer is relegated to an action
against his own non-depository bank. The underlying rationale is
that a depository bank"' is too far removed from events surrounding
"issue" and would thus be handicapped in marshalling those facts
necessary to successfully defend a conversion suit on the ground of
drawer negligence. 6 4 Citing Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 2 65 with approval, scholars White and Sum-
mers explain, "[i]f the drawer's negligence is the central issue in
most such cases, it makes sense to require the drawee to be the
defendant."
2 66
259. Supra note 52.
260. So close is a "holder" to possible holder in due course status that section 30(2) of
England's Bills of Exchange Act reads:
Every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course; but if
in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue, or
subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected with fraud, duress, or force and
fear, or illegality, the burden of proof is shifted, unless and until the holder
proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith
been given for the bill.
Ladup Ltd. v. Shaikh (Nadeem) (1983), 1 Q.B. 225 (1982), 3 W.L.R. 172 at 178c.
261. See text corresponding to notes 73-135, supra.
262. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Company
of Greenfield, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
263. "Depository bank" means the first bank to which an item is transferred for collec-
tion even though it is also the payor bank. U.C.C. § 4-105(a) (1983). "Payor bank" means a
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted. U.C.C. §4-105(b) (1983). In these
examples, Statebank is referred to as the drawee or drawee bank but would also be a "payor
bank."
264. See U.C.C. §§ 4-406(5) and 3-406 (1983); WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at
501.
265. Supra note 262.
266. Supra note 264.
In our example, there is no cause of action against Statebank if
the payee steals the instrument and the indorsement is not forged.
What other rights, then, does a preparer of unissued order paper
have?2 67 Even though the apparent drawer 268 has no right to pre-
sent 6' the apparent instrument 7 0 to drawee 271 for payment if it is
apparently payable272 to a third party's apparent order 273 the drawer
has, in addition to the naked right to physical possession of the writ-
ing, other axiomatic and inherent rights. First, even though he has
lost possession of the writing, he has the right to stop payment. This
statutory right27 4 gives some27 5 security, but the security is limited to
267. "The claimant who has lost possession of an instrument so payable or indorsed that
another may become a holder has lost his rights on the instrument, which by its terms no
longer runs to him." U.C.C. § 3-306, Official Comment 5 (1983).
268. Query whether the drawer of an unissued instrument is a "drawer," since "draw"
and "drawer" connotes some motion? Supra note 35. A check is a draft if it is an "order."
U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(a) and (b) (1983). An "order" is a direction to pay. U.C.C. § 3-102(l)(a)
(1983). Again, there is connoted a movement (relationship outside oneself). It is a physical
impossibility to give an "authoritative indication" to pay (see definition of "direction," MOR-
Ris, supra note 35) before volition has congealed and been manifested by some overt act,
moving the instrument out of one' own possession by a first delivery issue. It seems more
realistic to regard the unissued instrument as not an "instrument" at all because it does not
move away from the preparer and therefore does not contain a promise or order to pay to
anyone. That is why, in contrast, we refer to the issued instrument as "running" to the payee.
An unissued instrument cannot run. Picture the writing still connected to the stub and untorn
from the checkbook. Is it "drawn"? There is judicial opinion to the effect that signature alone
does not constitute "execution" of an instrument which remains a "nullity" and not "made"
until it is delivered. See cases cited at I I AM. JR. 2d 297, 298-99 (1963). An instrument "has
no legal inception or valid existence as such until it has been delivered in accordance with the
purpose and intention of the parties." Id. at 298. This concept was codified in Negotiable
Instruments Law Sec. 16 and was true under common law and the Code. Id. But in the Code,
the concept is woven or absorbed into the texture of, rather than clearly enunciated in, Article
Three.
269. See section 3-504 of the Code which provides for how presentment is made.




274. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1983). What happens, however, if a third party induces the
preparer by fraud to issue to a payee and preparer discovers the fraud, stops his check and is
sued by payee? In Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 34 (1862), affid 5 B. & S. 968 (1864), it was
said:
If A by means of a false pretence, or a promise or condition which he does not
fulfill, procures B to give him a note or cheque or acceptance in favour of C, to
whom he pays it, and who receives it bona fide, for value, B remains liable on his
acceptance. His acceptance imports value and liability prima facie, and he can
only relieve himself from his promise to pay C by shewing that C is not holder
for value or that he received the instrument with notice, or not bona fide.
Quoting Hasan v. Willson, I Lloyd's Rep. 431 (1977). In Hasan, plaintiff payee never met
drawer in connection with sale of some four hundred tons of gold coins for $445,750,000;
although plaintiff had no actual notice of the fraud, it was found that he wilfully abstained
from making inquiries and that drawer was not liable in suit brought after payment was coun-
termanded. However, under English law, a payee cannot be a holder in due course. Id. Cf.
U.C.C. § 3-302(2) (1983).
275. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 63-68 regarding stop payment orders and
clauses which disclaim bank liability, despite section 4-103(1); Dinerman v. National Bank of
North America, 89 Misc. 2d 164, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (burden of proving
actual loss is on customer; if money was owed by him anyway, bank's payment after the stop
six-month blocks of time.276 Moreover, the right is worth no more
than a post-theft barndoor lock if exercised after the instrument is
paid277 or accepted.27 8 In that case, victim Drew has lost not only
possession of his writing but also use of his money and probably the
face amount of the instrument.
Assume Drew leaves his home and goes to work without knowl-
edge that Pace stole the writing from his desk. If Pace negoti-
ates-indorses and delivers-to a holder in due course, the holder in
due course takes free of Drew's title claim to the instrument and any
defense of nondelivery.27 9 Once the paper falls into the hands of a
holder in due course, the unissued, nonexistent instrument may be-
come Drew's obligation to pay.
The small slip of paper in the form of a negotiable instrument
may be as good as gold and even more dangerous to keep. It has
been held that the preparer of such an unissued negotiable instru-
ment "must care for it as much as he would his paper money. "280
But that characterization can be an understatement; if Drew leaves
$10,000 in cash in his desk or at Pace's office and Pace disappears
with the money, Drew can call the police department to seek assis-
tance. If he tells the story about his "unissued" check, the police
response undoubtedly would be that it is a "civil matter" and that he
should consult legal counsel. If the stop order is received after the
instrument is either accepted by or paid to a holder in due course,
Drew is relegated to his cause of action against thief Pace. Of
course, Drew in this example never received the Matisse, but failure
of consideration is a personal defense 28 1 not good against a holder in
due course. If "rights" to possession of an instrument are in any way
related to possible risks of its loss, Drew's "rights" are substantial;
his Article Three or other practical legal remedies trifling.
order is of "no harm" to customer); U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1983).
276. If the stop order is oral, it is effective for fourteen days; if it is written, then for six
months unless renewed in writing. See U.C.C. § 4-403(2) (1983).
277. See U.C.C. § 4-403(1) (1983) (the stop order must give the bank a reasonable
opportunity to act), U.C.C. § 4-213 (1983) and FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 215-88 as to
"payment" and "final payment" problems; Georgia R. R. Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 229 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. App. 1976), aJJ'd 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977) ($25,000
check mistakenly under-encoded and treated as "2,500"); David Graubert, Inc. v. Bank
Leumi Trust Co., 48 N.Y.2d 554, 399 N.E.2d 930, 423 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1979) (agreement
modifying midnight deadline as to dishonored, represented check); see also First Nat'l Bank v.
Nunn, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d I 110 (Mont. 1981); West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Ex-
change Bank, 37 Wis.2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968); Kane v. American Nat'l Bank, 21 I11.
App.3d 1046, 316 N.E.2d 177 (1974).
278. Certification of a check is acceptance and, if procured by a holder (rather than the
drawer), the drawer and all prior indorsers are discharged. See U.C.C. § 3-411(1) and § 3-
413(3) (1983).
279. U.C.C. § 3-305(1), § 3-306(a) and § 3-306, Official Comment 2 (1983).
280. City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 105 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir.
1939).
281. U.C.C. § 3-306(c) (1983).
In addition to the right to stop payment, if the writing leaves his
possession prior to issuance, Drew also loses his right to tear up or
destroy the instrument. His right to destroy is the neatest, most com-
plete means of self-help available to Drew. It is a more immediate
and more conclusive right than the right to stop payment.
The right to destroy is valuable not only to the drawer but also
to commerce and the courts. It allows one who prepared a writing to
prevent nightmarish consequences like theft by a denominated
payee, and it affords any preparer of an unissued writing in the form
of a negotiable instrument the most swift, efficient and complete way
to correct an error on his part. Perhaps the error consisted of making
out the check to a wrong party; 82 misspelling a payee's name;
283
omitting one of two or more joint payees;2 84 failing to properly indi-
cate drawing in a representative capacity;285 writing the instrument
in an inept or sloppy manner which facilitates an alteration costly to
the drawer; 286 inserting an incorrect date;287  supplying a wrong
amount; 288 making out an instrument for an obligation which was
previously satisfied;289 discovering fraud after preparation of the in-
strument;2 90 executing the instrument under duress;291 preparing the
instrument for an illegal transaction292 before deciding to abandon
the crime;293 learning of the right to refuse to repay a usurious
loan;294 preparing the instrument while intoxicated;295 preparing the
282. See U.C.C. §§ 3-110, 3-111 and 3-117 (1983). In all examples given in the text as
reasons why a preparer might want to destroy rather than issue, it must be noted that there
are dramatic consequences (and concurrent perils) involved not only if the instrument gets to a
holder in due course but also from failing to destroy the instrument. See supra note 187-88.
283. Id.; U.C.C. § 3-203 (1983).
284. Id.; U.C.C. § 3-116 (1983).
285. If signed in a representative capacity, the preparer risks incurring personal liability
for a principal's obligation. See U.C.C. § 3-403 (1983).
286. See supra notes 187-88; U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 3-407 (1983).
287. U.C.C. §§ 3-109, 3-108, 3-114 (1983) and note 282, supra.
288. See U.C.C. § 3-118 and note 282, supra.
289. U.C.C. §§ 3-408, 3-306(c), 3-307(2) (1983); note 282, supra.
290. Garden variety fraud in the inducement (deceit as to the nature of the transaction
in contrast to the nature of the instrument) is not a real defense and is useless against one
holding in due course. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c) (1983); supra note 282.
291. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(b) (1983); supra note 242; Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dis-
trict, 246 Cal. App.2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966) ("duress" as contrasted with undue
influence; determining when persuasion overflows its "normal banks" and becomes "oppressive
flood waters").
292. Id.; For a discussion of what is "illegally void" for section 3-305 purposes, see
Driscoll, supra note 23; Bankers Trust, supra note 23.
293. Id. The turning back is paramount, not the initial wrongful intentions. Aikman v.
City of Wheeling, 120 W. Va. 46, 195 S.E. 667 (1938) (check proffered on condition that
payee suppress criminal prosecution).
294. See supra notes 282 and 292. The whole area of "illegality," including "usury"
under section 3-305, is left to local law and policy. If the obligation under local law is merely
voidable (as in most cases it will be) rather than void, once the instrument falls into the hands
of the holder in due course, it blossoms into an obligation to pay. See U.C.C. § 3-305, Official
Comment 6 (1983).
295. See supra note 291. Only such incapacity as renders the underlying obligation void
instrument while in a "manicky" state;296 or discovering that a faith-
less employee furnished a "fictitious payee. 2 97 The possible reasons
why a drawer might want to destroy an instrument are almost as
varied as the reasons why he might want to issue. Because of a deep-
rooted legal aversion to "Indian giving," the right to destroy cannot
be exercised post-issuance. One old case held that getting an instru-
ment back and destroying it does not reinvest title to the instrument
in the preparer.2 98
In example C above, if Drew destroyed the instrument instead
of putting it in his desk drawer, there would be no legal problems to
solve. The right to destroy is one of the most basic and valuable
property rights known to man.2 99 It is what makes a dog happy
about receiving a bone; he can legally consume it, i.e., eat and de-
stroy it, because it is his. A man can opt to deliver a bone or to
discard or destroy it. If he leaves it unguarded and a dog surrepti-
tiously takes it, the man will smile, realizing he has only himself to
blame. He assumed that risk in keeping the bone. Retention can
sometimes be negligence per se.
Along with his loss of possession of the instrument, Drew may
also lose his right to change his mind. Where, for example, Drew
prepares an instrument to tender as a gift but the payee steals it
prior to issuance, the instrument in the hands of a holder in due
course becomes a binding obligation to give a gift.300 Again, failure
of consideration is not a valid defense against a holder in due
course.
301
is a "real" (supra note 43) defense. Compare Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d
196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, (1960) (involuntional melancholia); J.P. DAWSON,
W.B. HARVEY AND S.D. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 487-511 (4th ed.
1982). These cases involve contracts, not instruments. In Estate of Lucas v. Whiteley, 550
S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), a Texas law rendering the incompetent's instrument voida-
ble only did not assist the holder of a $120,000 note-of an adjudicated incompetent executed
through his attorney with whom the holder had dealt. See supra note 45.
296. Faber v. Sweet Style Manufacturing Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763
(Sup. Ct. 1963) (no "irrationality" or other abnormality except manic speed sufficed to grant
rescission of a contract on grounds of psychosis). See also supra note 295.
297. See U.C.C. § 3-405(l)(b) (1983).
298. Novak v. Reeson, 110 Neb. 229, 193 N.W. 348 (1923) (Morrison, C.J., dissenting)
(notes made out to maker's daughters given to son to hold; that maker later burned the notes
did not invalidate the completed irrevocable gift); State v. Cohen, 196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W.
922 (1935) (woman guilty of larceny for taking back a coat she had left with furrier without
paying for its repairs).
299. "Destruction realizes appropriation perhaps more keenly than creation does, for the
object destroyed is no longer there to show itself impenetrable . . . .In making use of my
bicycle I use it up-wear it out; that is, continuous appropriative creation is marked by a
partial destruction." SARTRE, supra note 3, at 593. "Actually the gift is a primitive form of
destruction." Id. By giving it away, I constitute the object as absent. "But the craze to destroy
which is at the bottom of generosity is nothing else than a craze to possess." Id. at 594.
300. But see text corresponding to note 298, supra.
301. Supra note 187-88. Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 3-305 says a holder in due
course takes free from all defenses, including nondelivery; but the Comment does not employ
Drew can argue that it is absolutely a legal and philosophical
impossibility for there to be a "holder" or a "holder in due course"
of an instrument which was never issued;302 that no one can acquire
any rights on an unissued instrument, since no "instrument" exists
until delivery occurs; that there can be no "instrument" without a
promise or order to pay and that there is no such thing as a mute or
implied Article Three promise or order; and that an unissued "in-
strument" is ambulatory like the will of a living testator before his
death because the instrument can be destroyed or revoked prior to
issuance. Drew can cite the line of cases s0 which hold that delivery
must include an intent to pass title,30 4 and he can emphasize that
many cases hold that an instrument is not deemed "executed" 3 5 un-
til it is delivered. He can argue that "issue" necessitates movement.
He can claim that because he never caused the instrument to move
and it was merely taken against his will or was found among his
possessions,306 it is only an "apparent instrument," not a legally valid
one.
Drew can also raise a constitutional issue. Does the Code de-
prive Drew of property without due process of law? No, said one
court,3 07 applying previous negotiable instruments law. While deliv-
ery is required to put an instrument "in force," when the paper:
is found complete on its face in the hands of one not its maker it
is to be regarded as delivered unless the contrary is shown, but
.. . in the hands of a holder in due course no enquiry is to be
made into delivery, but the right of the holder is to be held inde-
feasible by a want of delivery. This is a regulation of the conse-
quences of fully executing such a paper and by any means suf-
fering it to come into the hands of a holder in due course. [The
statutes direct the courts] to forbear enquiry into the fact of de-
the Code term "issue."
302. Supra notes 139-52 and corresponding text. Allegations of the "issue" of drafts or
checks, without more, connotes delivery. Insurance Co. of North America v. Knight, 8 Ill.
App. 3d 412, 291 N.E.2d 40 (1972).
303. E.g., Leverett v. Wanings, 97 Ga. App. 811, 104 S.E.2d 686; W.H. Barber Co. v.
Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
304. See cases cited at 11 AM. JUR. 2d Bills and Notes 297 (1963).
305. "The necessity for delivery of a bill or note depends upon the common law, the law
merchant, and the NIL or the Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper." II AM. JUR.
2d Bills and Notes 297, 298 (1963). The instrument "has no legal inception or valid existence
as such until it has been delivered" Id. (citations omitted). The word "execution" includes
delivery. In Re Herr's Estate's, 16 II1. App. 2d 534, 148 N.E.2d 815 (1958). An Indiana court
stretched delivery further into time and space by providing that the place where value was
given is determinative of the place of execution. W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63
N.E.2d 417 (1945); see U.C.C. § 3-303 (1983), discussing "value."
306. Shriver v. Danby, 12 Del. 390, 113 A. 612 (1921) (testator's note found among his
effects some eight or nine years after his death ineffective for want of delivery); In re Martens'
Estate, 226 Iowa 162, 283 N.W. 885 (1939) (daughter of decedent found sealed envelope in
her mother's safe with note payable to her order; note invalid for want of delivery).
307. New Port Richey, 105 F.2d at 351.
livery when it appears the completed instrument has come to a
holder in due course.
308
Thus, the donor of a gift must be careful lest he lose the right to
change his mind.30 9 Significantly, there is a case on all-fours with the
problem posited in Example C above in which the payee admitted in
open court having stolen the instrument. In Sapiro v. Rutledge10 an
aged maker of a $6,000 negotiable note" married the payee. Three
weeks later, feeling ill, he prepared the note, making it payable on
his death.31 2 He showed it to his wife who watched him put it into a
tin box in his safe. The parties were later divorced. At the divorce
trial, the wife testified about the details surrounding preparation of
the note and admitted that she secretly took it from the box about
five months after it was signed because she was afraid that her hus-
band would destroy it. In a subsequent action on the note by the
wife's lawyer, the court, after admitting a transcript of the wife's
testimony in the divorce case, held:
The note was obtained by the payee surreptitiously and against
the will of the maker, and . . . there never was any intentional
delivery of the note by the maker . . . . The only material
question remaining is: Was the plaintiff a holder in due course?
If the plaintiff was the holder in due course, he was entitled to
recover . . . notwithstanding the defect of title of the payee."
13
308. Id. (emphasis added). The "conclusive presumption" of delivery language in Nego-
tiable Instruments Law Section sixteen was omitted from the Code as unnecessary in view of
the wording of U.C.C. § 3-306 "which places the full burden of establishing the defense of
nondelivery" on the defendant when he lacks rights of a holder in due course. See U.C.C. § 3-
306 Official Comment 4 (1983). This cuts off the defense of nondelivery to a holder in due
course. See U.C.C. § 3-305 Official Comment 3 (1983).
309. New Port Richey, 105 F.2d at 350. New Port Richey continues:
We do not regard as important the conflicting decisions made prior to the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law touching liability on instruments stolen before delivery
(see 8 AM. JUR. Bills and Notes § 620 (1963) and cases cited). Cases decided
under the Negotiable Instruments Law tending to support our conclusions are
collected in Angus v. Downs, 85 Wash. 75, 147 P. 630, L.R.A. 1915E, 351, and
note in L.R.A. 1915E, 355. See also Rainier v. LaRue, 83 Ind. App. 28, 147
N.E. 312; Massachusetts Nat'[l] Bank v. Snow, 187 Mass. 159, 72 N.E. 959;
Ensign v. Forrest, 251 Mass. 296, 146 N.E. 655; Gruntal v. United States F. &
G. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682, 73 A.L.R. 1337.
Id. at 350-51.
310. 190 Iowa 1032, 181 N.W. 257 (1921).
31 I. Notes were not accepted as negotiable instruments until the 1704 Statue of Anne
gave them the same negotiable qualities as drafts. FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 44, 107.
312. Negotiable Instruments Law Section 4(3) recognized such instruments as negotia-
ble. Keeler v. Niles, 103 Neb. 465, 172 N.W. 363 (1919). They will not work under U.C.C. §
3-109(2); but an acceleration clause (e.g., "payable January 3, 2070 or upon my death, which-
ever sooner occurs") and postdated checks (in one case dated fifteen years ahead; see Smith v.
Gentilotti, 371 Mass. 839, 359 N.E.2d 953 (1977)) have been successfully used under the
Code. QUINN, supra note 95, at S3-8.
313. 190 Iowa at -, 181 N.W. at 257.
The lawyer, however, never proved "that he paid anything for the
note; nor that he had no notice of defenses; nor that he knew nothing
of the circumstances under which the note was received. 31 4 The
trial court's directed verdict for the defendant was unanimously af-
firmed, but only because the lawyer failed to prove holder in due
course status, not because of the instrument's nonissuance.
In Example C, what if Drew arranged to give the writing to
Pace when he arrived with the sketch but changed his mind upon
viewing it? Even if the parties had entered into an oral bilateral con-
tract, Drew could change his mind, destroy his check and, if sued on
the underlying agreement, plead the Article Two statute of frauds
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as an affirmative defense. If the payee stole the writing and negoti-
ated it further into commerce, the writing might, because of its ne-
gotiability, fall into the hands of a holder in due course. By losing
possession of the instrument, Drew would thereby lose his right to
destroy and to plead unenforceability of a contract. The possible un-
happy scenarios for a nonissuing preparer of an apparent instrument
become Proustian in magnitude.
In Miller v. Race,316 the bearer note was properly issued and
thereafter stolen; hence, no "issuance" question was involved. Fur-
thermore, when Lord Mansfield laid down the principle that instru-
ments pass through commerce not like goods but like currency, he
meant issued instruments and issued currency. 31 7 Similarly, when
the law speaks to implementing the "intentions of a testator "in will
construction cases, it means the intentions of a deceased testator, not
the intentions of a living testator as expressed in an apparent will.
When Article Three uses the word "instrument," it speaks to issued,
not unissued, instruments - just as "currency" means issued, not
unissued, money.
There is little doubt, for example, that if the United States pre-
pared currency which underwent inspection and then was readied for
delivery 3 8 and forty thugs surprised security at the mint and stole
packets of notes ready for delivery to banks, the United States could
recover these notes from the thieves. If the thieves used some of
these notes which passed to good faith purchasers for value, the
United States could get the notes back from the purchasers by tak-
ing the position that the notes were never issued and are not "cur-
314. Id.
315. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1983).
316. Supra note 52.
317. Supra note 305.
318. It is "manually steel-banded and wrapped in packages for delivery," each currency
package containing forty banks of one hundred notes each and weighing about eight pounds; or
sometimes notes in units of one hundred are delivered from the machine for packaging prior to
delivery to banks. FACTS ABOUT MONEY, supra note 9, at 12.
rency" until they are voluntarily delivered to banks as first hold-
ers.""9 The currency could undoubtedly be confiscated as if it were
counterfeit, 320 and the good faith purchasers would be relegated to
go after the transferors.
A person may say he "has" or "owns" money, but only the pro-
spective issuer-the United States-has a right, even after its issu-
ance, to destroy321 currency.322 A holder may destroy an instrument,
and a preparer has the same right, but once a holder has.voluntarily
delivered, he cannot repossess and destroy.323
A preparer of an instrument has three choices: to issue, to de-
stroy, or to retain. If he elects to retain, whether his conduct is la-
belled laches, estoppel, or Article Three impermissible ambivalence,
unless there is a forged payee indorsement, a holder in due course
will get the same rights on the instrument as if it was issued.
It seems, then, that the process of negotiation to a holder in due
course generates into the atmosphere an electrical-like charge or le-
gal synapse. In this current, as long as there is no forged indorse-
ment, unissued paper crosses from nothingness into being. Title to
the writing flashes from preparer to holder in due course by instanta-
neous adverse possession. The instrument simultaneously material-
izes, matures and cuts off all personal defenses of any party with
whom the holder in due course has not dealt.324 Having pulsated
319. When member banks of the Federal Reserve System need money:
They authorize the Federal Reserve bank to charge their reserve accounts and
ship the currency. Usually, nonmember banks procure their currency through a
correspondent member bank located in the same city as the Federal Reserve
Bank, or by arrangement whereby the currency is shipped direct to the nonmem-
ber bank with the reserve account of the correspondent bank being charged for
the shipment. To obtain Federal Reserve notes, a Federal Reserve bank applies
to the Federal Reserve agent, a representative of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, who is located at the Reserve bank and who maintains
a stock of unissued notes. In applying for notes, the bank must pledge with the
agent the required collateral ....
Id. at 24. Regarding the collateral, see supra note 10. Delivery to one of the Federal Reserve
banks is the "first delivery" or "issue" as used in the Code, however, Article Three does not
apply to money. Commonwealth v. Saville, 353 Mass. 458, 233 N.E.2d 9 (1968).
320. If stolen and permitted to move in commerce without the prescribed collateral
backup (see supra note 10), the general welfare and economy could be adversely affected.
However, the Bureau of Printing and Engraving, Department of the Treasury, was unable to
opine "without researching" the point as to whether the United States could recover unissued
currency from good faith purchasers. Telephone interview with Bill Cobert, Esq., Legal De-
partment, Bureau of Printing and Engraving, Dept. of the Treasury, April 11, 1985.
321. Incineration or pulverization is used until it is "reduced to an unidentifiable residue
so that no recovery of the notes and of the distinctive paper on which they are imprinted" is
possible. FACTS ABOUT MONEY, supra note 9, at 24. There are over two billion one dollar bills
in circulation which normally last only eighteen months, and before being destroyed, all money
goes through a careful verification and counting "special internal control process." Id.
322. Pieces of mutilated currency which are not clearly more than one-half of the origi-
nal note will not be exchanged unless the Treasury is satisfied that the missing portions have
been totally destroyed. No relief is granted for totally destroyed paper currency. Id. at 25-26.
323. Supra note 298.
324. Supra note 45.
over the line between appearance and reality, the instrument be-
comes enforceable. The holder in due course thus may 3 5 collect on
an unissued instrument just as if it were issued.
VI. Conclusion
Under Article Three, where possession reigns as pope, title most
frequently is a mere communicant. Justice and reason seem to hud-
dle on steps outside the Code among thieves. Article Three's highest
doctrinal commandment is and must be: Thou Shalt Not Fetter the
Free Motion of Instruments in Commerce.
The existence of this strange meritocracy within concurrent le-
gal worldviews at first glance seems an antithesis within a thesis.
Article Three and the rights and risks which it appears to confer
upon holders, owners, thieves, good faith purchasers and banks must
and do peacefully co-exist with the rest of our laws and values.
How?
The unissued instrument negotiated without forged indorsement
when in the hands of a holder in due course becomes what it is not
and is not what it is.
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The philosophy of the Code is that if instruments are to func-
tion as cash substitutes, the law must create and maintain arteries
through which they will pass. The more movable the property, the
more possession forces title out of the pilot's seat. One who holds
voidable title to land may pass no better title than he himself has.
Nemo dat quod non habet.32 7 One who possesses voidable title to
goods may pass a better title than he himself has to a bona fide
purchaser for value.328 Since commercial paper "flies" through com-
merce at much greater velocity than goods, when a holder in due
course takes, even "issue" questions are left behind in the wake of
the instrument's motion.
As one English court held in 1856, "One whohas signed but not
delivered a completed instrument is liable on it to an innocent pur-
chaser though it should be lost or stolen from him.329
325. The most difficult hurdle to overcome, as in all Article Three cases, is proof of
holder in due course status. See, e.g., Sapiro supra note 310. The elements of U.C.C. § 3-302
"are but doors which open onto breath-taking vistas of complex statutory and decisional law."
WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 45, at 458.
326. SARTRE, supra note 3, at 70.
327. Supra notes 16-28, 54.
328. Supra note 224.
329. A.W. ROGERS, FALCONBRIDGE ON BANKING AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 523 (7th ed.
1969), citing Ingham v. Primrose (1856) 7 C.B.N.S. 82, 85, 141 E.R. 745. "[Nlon obstante
the disapproval-directed rather to another point-expressed by Brett L.J. in Baxendale v.
Bennett (1878), 3 Q.B.D. 525 at 532; cf. Swan v. North British Australasian Co. (1863), 2 H.
& C. 175, at p. 184, 159 E.R. 73. ... Id. As to "incohate bills," today's British authors
state, "Thus if A signs a cheque form and does not complete it and it is stolen from his desk
The Code embodies the same approach. To a preparer of an
instrument in negotiable form, Article Three mandates, "Issue your
paper or destroy it; otherwise, despite lack of your volition, stand
ready to pay a holder in due course."
and filled in, A is under no liability to anyone on his signature, not even to a holder in due
course, because he did not deliver it in order that it might be converted into a bill." K. SMITH
AND D. KENNAN, ENGLISH LAW 448 (7th ed. 1982). Compare the provisions of U.C.C. § 3-
115 regarding incomplete instruments.

